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A Patent Reformist Supreme Court and 
Its Unearthed Precedent 
Samuel F. Ernst* 
How is it that the Supreme Court, a generalist court, is leading 
a project of innovation reform in our times while the court of 
appeals established to encourage innovation is having its 
precedent stricken down time and again? This decade the Supreme 
Court has issued far more patent law decisions than in any decade 
since the passage of the Patent Act of 1952. In doing so, the 
Supreme Court has overruled the Federal Circuit in roughly three-
quarters of the patent cases in which the Supreme Court has issued 
opinions. In most of these cases, the Supreme Court has 
established rules that favor accused infringers over patent holders, 
and the result has been an era of patent litigation reform far more 
impactful than anything Congress has achieved. Scholars have 
observed that the Supreme Court tends to overrule Federal Circuit 
decisions that (1) impose rigid legal rules as opposed to flexible 
standards; (2) adopt special rules for patent law cases rather than 
applying general principles of law and equity applicable to all 
federal cases; and/or (3) fail to grant sufficient discretion to the 
district courts. This paper examines the twenty-eight Supreme 
Court opinions overruling the Federal Circuit since 2000 and 
quantifies their rationales to discover that, while these reasons are 
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often invoked, the Supreme Court’s most common rationale is that 
the Federal Circuit has disregarded or cabined its older precedent 
from before the 1982 creation of the Federal Circuit, from before 
the 1952 Patent Act, and even from before the 20th Century. The 
Court has relied on this rationale in twenty-one of the twenty-eight 
cases. The paper then seeks to probe beneath the surface level 
patterns to discover the deeper roots of the discord between the 
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit. Constitutional law 
scholars have observed that the Supreme Court’s policy 
preferences are the primary, unstated motivation behind its 
decisions. The Court writes opinions that rely on the flexible tools 
of precedent and stare decisis in order to implement its policy 
choices while maintaining its institutional reputation for neutrality. 
The Court does this by influencing precedent vitality; the Court 
selects which of its precedent to rely upon and augment and which 
of its precedent to distinguish and narrow. This process runs in 
direct conflict with the Federal Circuit, a court that was originally 
conceived and viewed by some of its members as a court intended 
to bring uniformity to patent law in a way that would reinvigorate 
patent rights. The Federal Circuit would implement the 1952 
Patent Act in a way that would draw patent law out of the 
nineteenth century. But for the Supreme Court, the 1952 Act was a 
mere codification of patent law as developed by the courts for over 
a hundred years. Hence, the Federal Circuit seeks to influence 
precedent vitality at direct cross-purposes with the Supreme Court. 
The result of the Supreme Court’s project has been a new era of 
common law patent reform in favor of accused infringers, which is 
gaining momentum as the Supreme Court decides far more patent 
cases than it has since the passage of the Patent Act of 1952. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court has issued far more opinions in patent 
cases this decade than in any decade since the passage of the Patent 
Act of 1952.1 The Court has issued thirty-one patent law opinions 
in the 2010s, fifteen more than the decade finishing a distant 
second, the 1960s, which saw the issuance of only sixteen patent 
law opinions.2 Nor is there any sign the Court is slowing down in 
its engagement with patent law; the Court recently granted 
certiorari in another patent law case,3 making it likely that the 
Court will issue as many as thirty-five patent law opinions this 
decade. 
This sudden surge in patent law activity at the high court raises 
questions with respect to the Supreme Court’s relationship with the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the circuit court with 
nationwide appellate jurisdiction over patent law. Since its creation 
in 1982,4 the Federal Circuit has never received more scrutiny 
from the Supreme Court.5 No doubt this is due in part to the 
growing importance of patent disputes in a legal landscape 
featuring booming high technology and pharmaceutical industries, 
cellphone wars, and patent trolls stalking the horizon.6 But these 
phenomena were present in the 2000s as well, a decade that saw 
the issuance of only ten Supreme Court substantive patent law 
opinions.7 Rather, this sudden burst of activity indicates the 
Supreme Court is increasingly interested in scrutinizing and, more 
                                                                                                             
1 See infra Section I.A.; see also Timothy B. Dyk, Thoughts on the Relationship 
Between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, 16 CHI.-KENT J. OF INTELL. PROP. 
67, 67 & Table 1 (2016) (“The Supreme Court takes a lot of our cases”); Seth P. 
Waxman, May You Live in Interesting Times: Patent Law in the Supreme Court, 17 CHI.-
KENT J. OF INTELL. PROP. 214, 215–16 (2018) (describing a “fourfold increase in the rate 
of patent decisions” since 2006). 
2 See infra Part I. 
3 See Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2678 (2018) 
(order granting certiorari). 
4 See Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (establishing the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit). 
5 See Waxman, supra note 1 at 216 (“In the 23 years between 1983 and its eBay 
decision in 2006, the Supreme Court decided 17 patent cases. In the 11 years since eBay, 
it decided 33.”). 
6 See Waxman, supra note 1 at 216 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s increased interest in 
patent law tracks the rising importance of intellectual property in our society.”). 
7 See infra Part I. 
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often than not, correcting the patent law jurisprudence of the 
Federal Circuit. 
Since the year 2000, the Supreme Court has reversed or 
vacated the Federal Circuit in patent law cases in 74% of the 
opinions it has issued reviewing that court8: ten judgments 
affirmed9 and 28 judgments reversed or vacated (in whole or in 
part).10 This reversal rate in patent law appeals combined with the 
                                                                                                             
8 These numbers do not include the case of Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 
U.S. 635 (2009), because although that appeal arose from a patent litigation proceeding, 
the issue before the Supreme Court was one of general civil procedure, not patent law. 
See id. at 1867 (holding that when a district court remands claims to a state court after 
declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, the remand order is not based on a lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction to preclude federal appellate review of the order). Nor do these 
numbers include the three Supreme Court patent law cases during this period on certiorari 
to courts other than the Federal Circuit. See Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 
2401, 2406 (2015) (on certiorari to the Ninth Circuit); F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 
136, 141 (2013) (on certiorari to the Eleventh Circuit); Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 
256 (2013) (on certiorari to the Supreme Court of Texas). 
9 The ten affirmances are: Oil States Energy v. Greene’s Energy, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 
1379 (2018); Cuozzo Speed Techs. LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2146 (2016); Alice 
Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2360 (2014); Bowman v. Monsanto, 
569 U.S. 278, 289 (2013); Kappos v. Hyatt, 566 U.S. 431, 446 (2012); Microsoft Corp. v. 
i4i Ltd., 564 U.S. 91, 114 (2011); Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. 
Roche Molecular Sys., 563 U.S. 776, 793 (2011); Global-Tech Appliances v. SEB S.A., 
563 U.S. 754, 771 (2011); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 613 (2010); J.E.M. Ag 
Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 146 (2001). 
10 The twenty-eight opinions vacating or reversing the Federal Circuit (at least in part) 
since 2000 are: WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2139 
(2018) (reversed); SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1360 (2018) (reversed); 
Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1678 (2017) (vacated-in-part, reversed-in-
part); Impression Prods., v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1538 (2017) (reversed); 
TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1521 (2017) 
(reversed); SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 
954, 967 (2017) (vacated-in-part); Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 137 S. Ct. 734, 
743 (2017) (reversed); Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 436 (2016) 
(reversed); Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1935 (2016) (vacated); 
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1931 (2015) (vacated); Teva 
Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 843 (2015) (vacated); Nautilus, Inc. v. 
Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 913 (2014) (vacated); Limelight Networks, Inc. v. 
Akamai Techs., Inc., 572 U.S. 915, 924 (2014) (reversed); Highmark Inc. v. Allcare 
Health Mgmt. Sys., 572 U.S. 559, 564 (2014) (vacated); Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON 
Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 557 (2014) (reversed); Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski 
Family Ventures, LLC, 571 U.S. 191, 203 (2014) (reversed); Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 596 (2013) (affirmed-in-part, reversed-
in-part); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 566 U.S. 399, 426 (2012) 
(reversed); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 
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marked increase in the number of patent law appeals the Supreme 
Court wants to hear raises the question: how does the Supreme 
Court’s perspective on patent law differ from that of the Federal 
Circuit? What is the Supreme Court doing to patent law? 
Part I of this paper analyzes and quantifies the four most 
common justifications the Supreme Court gives for disturbing 
Federal Circuit patent law rulings: (1) that the Federal Circuit has 
disregarded or cabined Supreme Court precedent; (2) that the 
Federal Circuit imposed a rigid, inflexible rule where a general 
standard would be more appropriate; (3) that the Federal Circuit 
improperly created a special rule for patent law; and (4) that the 
Federal Circuit’s rule granted insufficient discretion to the district 
court. The appellate lawyer would be well advised to argue a 
combination of these points to get the Supreme Court’s attention 
on a petition for certiorari. The most common justification given 
by the Supreme Court for its reversal or vacatur of Federal Circuit 
patent rulings is that the Federal Circuit has disregarded or cabined 
Supreme Court precedent from prior to the 1982 creation of the 
Federal Circuit or from prior to the passage of the Patent Act of 
1952. The Court has relied on this rationale in twenty-one out of 
the twenty-eight opinions in which it has overruled the Federal 
Circuit on patent law issues since 2000.11 None of the three 
remaining rationales have been relied upon in more than nine 
opinions issued since 2000.12 
Part I of this paper continues by analyzing the Supreme Court’s 
patent law decisions this century to conclude that we are in an era 
of Supreme Court patent law reform to favor accused infringers. 
Out of the forty-one substantive patent law opinions issued by the 
Supreme Court since 2000 (including the three on certiorari to 
                                                                                                             
(2012) (reversed); Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 638 (2008) 
(reversed); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 459 (2007) (reversed); KSR 
Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 428 (2007) (reversed); MedImmune, Inc. v. 
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007) (reversed); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 
547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (vacated); Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 
28, 46 (2006) (vacated); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 208 
(2005) (vacated); Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 834 
(2002) (vacated); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 
742 (2002) (vacated). 
11 See infra Part I. 
12 See id. 
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regional circuits), twenty-four established a rule favoring accused 
infringers; eleven established a rule favoring patent holders; and 
six established a rule that may favor either party depending on the 
particular facts of the case.13 More important than these numbers, 
however, is the fundamental importance of Supreme Court rulings 
in remaking patent litigation to favor the accused. Since 2000, the 
Supreme Court has expanded the obviousness doctrine, given teeth 
to the doctrine of patent ineligible subject matter, revitalized the 
exhaustion doctrine, made it more difficult to obtain patent 
injunctions (particularly for non-practicing entities), narrowly 
construed statutes providing remedies for international 
infringement, strengthened the defense of patent claim 
indefiniteness, and made other common law reforms to favor 
accused infringers.14 
Part II of this paper steps out of the cloister of patent law 
scholarship to explore the reasons why the Court has chosen to 
pursue this policy of patent litigation reform. Supreme Court 
scholarship in other areas of law, such as constitutional law, 
indicates that the Court is influenced in its policy decisions by 
external forces in the legal system. As with these other areas of 
law, the Court has been influenced to pursue patent litigation 
reform because of several interrelated external factors: the 
explosion of patent enforcement litigation in the lower courts and, 
in particular, non-practicing entity litigation; litigation reform 
campaigns mounted by high tech businesses in response to NPE 
activity; a steep increase in the number of amicus briefs filed in 
patent cases; and a general metanarrative that, rather than 
encouraging innovation, patents can sometimes stand as a thicket 
to true innovation, because startup companies and other innovators 
must navigate a thicket of demand letters and lawsuits asserting 
patents that have never been commercialized just to get a product 
to market.15 
Part II concludes by exploring the methods employed by the 
Supreme Court in pursuing this agenda. Supreme Court scholars 
have observed that the Court pursues unstated legal policy 
                                                                                                             
13 See infra Part I. 
14 See id. 
15 See infra Part II. 
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objectives through the flexible and seemingly neutral tool of stare 
decisis to influence precedent vitality. This means amplifying 
precedent that supports the unstated policy goals and disregarding 
or narrowing precedent that stands opposed to those goals. With 
respect to patent law, the unmistakable conclusion is that the 
Supreme Court has pursued a policy of patent litigation reform to 
favor accused infringers, and has done so very effectively by 
relying on its precedent from two previous eras of patent law 
reform: (1) the late 1800s, when large railroad companies and 
farmers were plagued by a thicket of patents and non-practicing 
entities, in response to which the Supreme Court created common 
law reform to ease these crises; and (2) the 1930s to the 1960s, 
another period of patent common law reform when the courts were 
distrustful of patent monopolies and strengthened patent misuse, 
antitrust, and exhaustion remedies as well as invigorating the 
obviousness bar.16 
Part III of this paper explains why the Supreme Court’s patent 
litigation reform project has come into direct conflict with the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. From its founding in 
1982, the Federal Circuit’s early judges and stakeholders in the 
creation of the court viewed the court as intended to create 
uniformity in patent law in order to strengthen patent rights. If the 
Federal Circuit were to bring guidance and uniformity to patent 
law, this would require the creation of uniform, rigid rules and the 
rejection of flexible, equitable standards that granted too much 
discretion to the district courts to restrict patent rights. And if the 
Federal Circuit were to create patent law reforms to strengthen 
patent rights, then it would have to have a free hand in interpreting 
the 1952 Patent Act in new ways and not adhering to Supreme 
Court precedent from prior to the passage of the 1952 statute. All 
of this comes into direct conflict with the Supreme Court’s mission 
of reviving cases from eras of patent law reform that grant 
discretion to the district courts to rule on patent law cases with 
equity and flexibility in order to protect true innovations from the 
patent thicket.17 
                                                                                                             
16 See infra Part II. 
17 See infra Part III. 
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I. PATENT LAW REFORM AT THE SUPREME COURT: 2000–PRESENT 
A. The Patent Law Explosion at the Supreme Court 
At one time, patent law was an obscure area of the law, largely 
noticed only by patent practitioners.18 Relative to the current 
decade, the Supreme Court issued few patent law opinions in the 
decades after the passage of the 1952 Patent Act. The Court issued 
opinions in only five patent law cases in the 1950s (including cases 
from prior to the issuance of the Patent Act),19 and, although this 
number ticked up to sixteen cases in the 1960s,20 the Court 
continued at a relatively plodding pace: with ten cases in the 
1970s,21 seven cases in the 1980s,22 and eight cases in the 1990s.23 
But at the turn of the millennium, the Court’s interest in patent law 
markedly increased. The Court has decided forty-one cases on 
substantive patent law issues since the year 2000,24 and, in the 
current decade in particular, the Supreme Court’s interest in patent 
law has reached a frenetic level. As of the October 2018 term, the 
Court has decided thirty-one patent cases in this decade alone,25 far 
more than in any other decade since the 1940s. This sudden spike 
in patent law opinions is illustrated by the bar graph below: 
 
 
                                                                                                             
18 See CHRISTOPHER BEAUCHAMP, INVENTED BY LAW: ALEXANDER GRAHAM BELL AND 
THE PATENT THAT CHANGED AMERICA 6 (2015) (“Patent practice has long labored under a 
reputation for inaccessibility, professional specialization, and narrowly fact-specific court 
rulings. All these factors have functioned to distance patent law from the historical 
mainstream.”); Peter K. Yu, Teaching International Intellectual Property Law, 52 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 923, 924 (2008) (“Intellectual property law was in the backwater only a few 
decades ago.”). 
19 See U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457 (1957); Sanford v. 
Kepner, 344 U.S. 13 (1952); Besser Mfg. v. United States, 343 U.S. 444 (1952); U.S. v. 
U.S. Gypsum, 340 U.S. 76 (1950); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods., 339 
U.S. 605 (1950). 
20 See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Supreme Court Patent Cases, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION, 
available at https://writtendescription.blogspot.com/p/patents-scotus.html (last visited 
Nov. 7, 2018) [https://perma.cc/32Q2-K7EP]. 
21 See id. 
22 See id. 
23 See id. 
24 See cases cited supra notes 8–10. 
25 See id. 
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FIGURE 1: NUMBER OF PATENT LAW CASES DECIDED BY THE 
SUPREME COURT BY DECADE 
Of the forty-one patent law opinions the Court has issued since 
2000, all but three have been on certiorari to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.26 The Supreme Court vacated or 
reversed the Federal Circuit in whole or in part in twenty-eight 
cases and affirmed the Federal Circuit ten times for a reversal rate 
of 74% in patent cases.27 Various studies differ on how high the 
Federal Circuit’s reversal rate is relative to other circuits. One 
study concluded that, from 1999 to 2008, the Federal Circuit had 
the highest reversal rate of any circuit court.28 Another study 
looking at the years 2006-2016 concluded, “[o]ver the last ten 
terms, [the Federal Circuit’s] reversal rate has averaged around 
70%, just slightly above the circuit median of 66.7%.”29 An 
examination of the SCOTUSblog Stat Packs for the years 2010 to 
2017 reveals that the Federal Circuit had the sixth highest reversal 
rate of the thirteen circuit courts of appeals in all cases (not just 
patent cases): 
 
                                                                                                             
26 See id. 
27 See id. 
28 See Roy E. Hofer, Supreme Court Reversal Rates: Evaluating the Federal Courts of 
Appeals, 2 Landslide 8, 9 (2010) (concluding that from the years 1999 to 2008, the 
Federal Circuit had a reversal rate of 83%, which was higher than the Ninth Circuit’s 
reversal rate of 80% and higher than the circuit median of 68%). 
29 Dyk, supra note 1 at 71–72. 
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FIGURE 2: REVERSAL RATE BY CIRCUIT (2010–2017)30 
Circuit Affirmances Reversals 
or Vacaturs
Total 
Decided 
Percentage 
of Reversals 
Sixth 6 38 44 86.36% 
Eleventh 6 29 35 82.86% 
Third 7 24 31 77.42% 
Ninth 29 96 126 76.19% 
Eighth 7 20 27 74.07% 
Federal 11 27 38 71.05% 
Fifth 15 32 47 68.06% 
Second 15 22 37 59.46% 
DC 11 16 27 59.26% 
Seventh 11 16 27 59.26% 
Tenth 10 14 24 58.33% 
Fourth 14 13 27  48.15% 
First 8 7 15 46.67% 
Hence, the Federal Circuit had a slightly higher reversal rate in 
patent cases than it did in all cases, and this figure places the 
Federal Circuit sixth among all thirteen circuit courts of appeals 
with respect to overall reversal rate. But this should not be so, 
given that the Federal Circuit is a court established to have 
specialized expertise in the area of patent law while the Supreme 
Court is a generalist court. One would think that the Federal 
Circuit’s specialized expertise in patent law would cause it to err 
less frequently than the regional circuits do. 
Perhaps the Federal Circuit’s unduly high reversal rate in 
patent cases is explained by the nationwide reach of its appellate 
jurisdiction over patent law issues.31 One of the rationales for 
Supreme Court review is a split between the circuits,32 and this is 
generally not possible in patent law cases decided by a single court 
of appeals.33 Accordingly, the only basis for the Supreme Court to 
                                                                                                             
30 SCOTUSblog, “Stat Pack Archive,” available at http://www.scotusblog.com
/reference/stat-pack/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2018) [https://perma.cc/EX9P-QTXB]. 
31 See 28 U.S.C. § 1295. 
32 SUP. CT. R. 10(a). 
33 Dyk, supra note 1, at 75 (“Very few of the Federal Circuit cases reviewed by the 
Supreme Court involve circuit splits. By my estimation, only one over the last decade. 
And a study from 2013 found a total of only eight in the history of our court.”) (citing 
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review a Federal Circuit patent law opinion is that the Federal 
Circuit “has decided an important question of federal law that has 
not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or has decided an 
important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant 
decisions of this Court.”34 In other words, it appears that more 
often than not the Supreme Court elects to review Federal Circuit 
patent law decisions because at least four members of the Court 
disagree with those decisions. This suspicion is borne out by the 
high reversal rate.35 
B. Supreme Court Rationales for Overruling the Federal Circuit 
Why does the Supreme Court disagree with the Federal Circuit 
on patent law issues? Where does the Federal Circuit err in the 
Supreme Court’s view, and what rationales does the Supreme 
Court offer for overruling the Federal Circuit?  Scholars and other 
Court-observers have noted four principle rationales, which are 
often interrelated, that the Supreme Court frequently offers when 
explaining why the Federal Circuit was wrong: 
1) The Federal Circuit’s rule granted insufficient 
discretion to the district court;36 
                                                                                                             
Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Chertoff, 553 U.S. 571 (2008)); Mark S. Davies, Seeking 
Supreme Court Review in Patent Cases, Law360 (Apr. 21, 2008), 
https://www.law360.com/ip/articles/53599/seeking-supreme-court-review-in-patent-cases 
[https://perma.cc/VJ2C-WCEW]; Ryan Stephenson, Note, Federal Circuit Case Selection 
at the Supreme Court: An Empirical Analysis, 102 GEO. L.J. 271, 275 (2013)). But see 
Shubha Ghosh, A Court Divided, 17 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 346, 346 (2018) 
(pointing to “the splits within the Federal Circuit, as revealed in many en banc 
decisions,” and arguing that “[t]his division is one reason why patent law has taken up a 
larger part of the Supreme Court’s docket recently”). 
34 SUP. CT. R. 10(C). 
35 See cases cited supra notes 8–10. 
36 See, e.g., Daniel Kazhdan, Beyond Patents: The Supreme Court’s Evolving 
Relationship with the Federal Circuit, 94 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 275, 282 (2012) (noting 
cases where the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit for failing to grant sufficient 
deference to the district court or to the PTO); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A 
Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1057–
61 (2003) (Discussing the Federal Circuit’s refusal to defer to the district court in claim 
construction and obviousness determinations and the Supreme Court’s rejection of that 
approach); cf. Timothy R. Holbrook, The Federal Circuit’s Acquiescence(?), 66 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1061, 1061 (2017) (observing that in the early years of the Federal Circuit, “the 
Federal Circuit generally refused to defer to the USPTO in a manner inconsistent with 
administrative law principles”). 
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2) The Federal Circuit imposed a rigid, inflexible 
rule where a flexible standard would be more 
appropriate;37 
3) The Federal Circuit improperly created a special 
rule for patent law, rather than relying on general 
legal frameworks or principles of federal law;38 
and/or 
                                                                                                             
37 See, e.g., Ghosh, supra note 33, at 350 (“In the patent area, we witness the Court 
resorting to open ended standards as a counter to blunt rules.”); Dyk, supra note 1, at 80 
(“Our court, in keeping with the legislative history of our statute, views our task as in part 
articulating clear rules; the Supreme Court on the other hand views clear rules as often 
suspect.”); Kazhdan, supra note 36, at 282 (“Scholars, practitioners, and even a number 
of Federal Circuit judges have pointed to the Supreme Court’s repeated criticism of the 
Federal Circuit for applying bright-line rules in patent cases instead of looking to more 
case-specific factors.”) (citing Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE 
L.J. 2, 42 (2010) (arguing that the Supreme Court is “push[ing] back against Federal 
Circuit formalism”); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The 
Federal Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 808–14 (2008)); Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit: Visitation and Custody of Patent 
Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 28, 33 (2007) (referring to “[t]he [Supreme] 
Court’s general admonitions to avoid the use of rigid and mandatory formulas”); 
Katherine E. White, How the Supreme Court’s Decisions over the Last Decade Have Re-
Shaped Federal Circuit Jurisprudence, 35 N. KY. L. REV. 315, 324 (2008) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court prefers flexible rules over rigid ones”); Timothy R. Holbrook, The 
Supreme Court’s Complicity in Federal Circuit Formalism, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER 
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 1–2 (2003) (“The Federal Circuit increasingly has articulated rules 
of law to promote certainty, at the expense of fairness.” Holbrook’s 2003 article argues 
that “the Supreme Court has expressly encouraged this approach,” but we have seen that 
in the year’s since 2003, the Court has reversed course and frequently reversed the 
Federal Circuit for imposing rigid rules, perhaps inspired by Professor Holbrook’s 
article!); Jay Dratler, Jr. The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit: A Case of 
Supervision by Generalists, 5 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 185, 187 (2011) (“In virtually 
every case where [the Supreme Court has reversed the Federal Circuit], the High Court 
has rejected a narrow, formulaic rule proposed by the Federal Circuit and opted for 
something more general and flexible.”). 
38 See, e.g., Dyk, supra note 1 at 76 (“What is interesting, though, is that a significant 
proportion of the Supreme Court’s cases from our court involve reconciling our 
jurisprudence with jurisprudence in other areas. In other words, the Supreme Court thinks 
that part of its task is to bring to bear its generalist perspective on our specialty areas.”); 
Jeff Bleich & Josh Patashnik, The Federal Circuit Under Fire, S.F. Att’y, Fall 2014, at 
40, 41–42, available at https://m.mto.com/Templates/media/files/Reprints/Bleich%20
%20Patashnik%20—%20Supreme%20Court%20Watch%20Fall%202014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B2SL-XYT2] (“Is the Supreme Court too unsophisticated in patent law 
to appreciate the wise insights of expert Federal Circuit judges, or are those Federal 
Circuit judges too narrowly focused on patent law to appreciate the broader rules of 
jurisprudence, procedure, and statutory interpretation?”) 
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4) The Federal Circuit disregarded Supreme Court 
precedent.39 
This author has examined the twenty-eight patent law cases 
decided since 2000 where the Supreme Court has vacated or 
reversed the Federal Circuit in order to quantify how often the 
Supreme Court relies on each of these rationales. This analysis is 
complicated to some degree by the fact that these rationales are 
often interrelated and overlapping. For example, in Octane Fitness 
v. Icon Health & Fitness, the Court held that the Federal Circuit 
used an incorrect test for determining whether a case is 
“exceptional” under 35 U.S.C. § 285, allowing for an award of 
attorney’s fees.40 The Federal Circuit’s rule was that “‘[a] case 
may be deemed exceptional’ under § 285 only in two limited 
circumstances: ‘when there has been some material inappropriate 
conduct,’ or when the litigation is both ‘brought in subjective bad 
faith’ and ‘objectively baseless.’”41 The Court rejected this rule 
based on all four rationales discussed above. The Court reasoned 
that “[t]he framework established by the Federal Circuit in Brooks 
Furniture is unduly rigid,” (Rationale 2) and that “it impermissibly 
encumbers the statutory grant of discretion to district courts” 
(Rationale 1).42 Instead of creating a special rule for patent law, the 
                                                                                                             
39 See, e.g., Ghosh, supra note 33, at 350 (“[T]he Supreme Court has recourse to 
common law judging, reverting to concepts of reasonableness and its own precedent (as 
opposed to those of the Federal Circuit) in order to bring light to the darkness.”); 
Holbrook, supra note 36, at 1061 (pointing to “the early years of the [Federal Circuit’s] 
existence where, in light of the Supreme Court’s absence from the field of patent law, the 
Federal Circuit generally ignored––if not overruled––Supreme Court precedent”); Dyk, 
supra note 1, at 82 (noting with respect to patent subject matter eligibility that “[s]ome of 
the most significant patent jurisprudence is not the product of a detailed statute but of 
Supreme Court decisions that have created extra-statutory requirements for 
patentability . . . . Thus, older Supreme Court cases remain highly relevant in interpreting 
the doctrines”); White, supra note 37, at 324 (observing that the Supreme Court has made 
clear that the Federal Circuit should “follow Supreme Court precedent first before 
resorting to creating new Federal Circuit law”); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, What the 
Federal Circuit Can Learn from the Supreme Court–and Vice Versa, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 
787, 804 (2010) (“We will have to see whether the Federal Circuit made the issue of its 
authority as a specialized court to stray from Supreme Court precedents clear enough for 
the Supreme Court to consider the problem.”). 
40 Octane Fitness v. Icon Health & Fitness, 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1752–53 (2014). 
41 Id. at 1752 (quoting and reversing Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, 
Inc., 393 F.3d 1378 (2005)). 
42 Id. at 1755. 
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Federal Circuit should have awarded attorney’s fees based on 
flexible, equitable standards used by the courts in other areas of 
law, such as copyright law (Rationale 3): “As in the comparable 
context of the Copyright Act, ‘there is no precise rule or formula 
for making these determinations,’ but instead equitable discretion 
should be exercised ‘in light of the considerations we have 
identified.’”43 This approach was mandated by Supreme Court 
precedent in these other areas of law that the Federal Circuit had 
failed to apply (Rationale 4).44 The Federal Circuit had further 
disregarded Supreme Court precedent that had held that “the 
addition of the phrase ‘exceptional case’ to § 285 was ‘for 
purposes of clarification only’” and did not overrule years of 
precedent to create a rigid standard unique to patent law to cabin 
the discretion of the district court (Rationales 1, 2, 3, 4).45 In place 
of the Federal Circuit’s rule, “[d]istrict courts may determine 
whether a case is ‘exceptional’ in the case-by-case exercise of their 
discretion, considering the totality of the circumstances.”46 Hence, 
the rationales are often interrelated and overlapping. The reader is 
therefore advised that the counts below do not indicate the total 
number of cases in which the Court has relied exclusively on one of 
the four rationales. Rather, these are the number of cases in which 
the Court has relied on at least the rationale in question, and 
perhaps on other of the rationales as well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
43 Id. at 1756 (quoting Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994)). 
44 Id. (citing Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 534). 
45 Id. at 1753 (citing General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 653, n. 8 
(1983)). 
46 Id. at 1756. 
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FIGURE 3: SUPREME COURT RATIONALES FOR OVERRULING THE 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT IN PATENT CASES (SINCE 2000) 
Close analysis of the twenty-eight Supreme Court opinions 
since 2000 vacating or reversing the Federal Circuit on patent law 
issues reveals that the most frequent rationale given by the Court 
for reversing the Federal Circuit is that the court of appeals has 
disregarded its precedent from before the 1982 creation of the 
Federal Circuit. The Supreme Court has relied on this rationale in 
twenty-one of the twenty-eight opinions.47 By comparison, the 
Supreme Court has corrected the Federal Circuit for failing to grant 
sufficient discretion to the district court in six cases.48 The Court 
has faulted the Federal Circuit for creating a rigid, inflexible rule in 
eight cases.49 And the Court has overruled the Federal Circuit for 
creating a special rule for patent law in nine cases.50 Five of the 
twenty-eight opinions involved pure statutory construction and 
relied on none of these rationales.51 The bar graph above illustrates 
the relative number of cases in which the Court has relied on each 
of these rationales in the twenty-eight cases. 
 
                                                                                                             
47 See infra Section I.B.4 for discussion and citations. 
48 See infra Section I.B.1 for discussion and citations. 
49 See infra Section I.B.2 for discussion and citations. 
50 See infra Section I.B.3 for discussion and citations. 
51 See infra Section I.B.4 for discussion and citations. 
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1. Cases in Which the Supreme Court Overruled the Federal 
Circuit for Granting Insufficient Discretion to the District 
Court 
Several commentators have observed a pattern of the Supreme 
Court overruling the Federal Circuit when the Federal Circuit fails 
to grant sufficient discretion to the district court.52 In fact, the 
Court has reversed the Federal Circuit on this basis in only six of 
the twenty-eight cases in this study.53 
It is natural that this issue would not arise with tremendous 
frequency because it is most often implicated in cases involving 
the standard of appellate review under a statute appearing to grant 
discretion to the district court, and not all cases involve such 
                                                                                                             
52 See, e.g., Daniel Kazhdan, Beyond Patents: The Supreme Court’s Evolving 
Relationship with the Federal Circuit, 94 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 275, 282 (2012) (noting 
cases where the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit for failing to grant sufficient 
deference to the district court or to the PTO); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A 
Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1057–
61 (2003) (discussing the Federal Circuit’s refusal to defer to the district court in claim 
construction and obviousness determinations and the Supreme Court’s rejection of that 
approach); cf. Timothy R. Holbrook, The Federal Circuit’s Acquiescence(?), 66 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1061, 1061 (2017) (observing that in the early years of the Federal Circuit, “the 
Federal Circuit generally refused to defer to the USPTO in a manner inconsistent with 
administrative law principles”). 
53 See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1935 (2016) (holding that 
the district court’s determination of whether to award enhanced damages for willful 
infringement must be reviewed for abuse of discretion); Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. 
Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 843 (2015) (holding that the court of appeals must apply a 
deferential “clear error” standard in reviewing factual determinations underlying district 
court claim constructions); Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 
1749 (2014) (“We therefore hold that an appellate court should apply an abuse-of-
discretion standard in reviewing all aspects of a district court’s § 285 determination [of 
whether a case is ‘exceptional’ and attorney fees should be awarded]”); Octane Fitness, 
LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1758 (2014) (“The framework 
established by the Federal Circuit [for determining whether a case is exceptional under 
the Patent Act’s fee shifting provision]  . . .  is unduly rigid, and it impermissibly 
encumbers the statutory grant of discretion to district courts.”); KSR Int’l. Co. v. 
Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 428 (2007) (“Rigid preventive rules [with respect to the non-
obviousness determination] that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are 
neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it.”); eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (The Federal Circuit erred in part 
because “the decision whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the equitable 
discretion of the district courts.”). 
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matters. Indeed, this was the issue in four of the six cases in this 
category. In a pair of related cases, Octane Fitness and Highmark 
v. Allcare Health Management Systems, the Court held, 
respectively: (1) that the Federal Circuit’s rule for determining that 
a case was “exceptional” under the Patent Act’s fee shifting statute 
was unduly rigid in a way that failed to give sufficient discretion to 
the district court;54 and (2) that the Federal Circuit must review 
such “exceptional case” determinations for abuse of discretion.55 In 
these cases the Court was interpreting Section 285 of the Patent 
Act,56 which provides, “[t]he [district] court in exceptional cases 
may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”57 
Similarly, in Halo Electronics v. Pulse Electronics, the Court 
interpreted Section 284 of the Patent Act to decide that the Federal 
Circuit granted insufficient deference to the district court in 
reviewing determinations as to whether treble damages should be 
awarded for willful infringement.58 The Court concluded that the 
Federal Circuit must apply an abuse of discretion standard in 
reviewing such determinations because “Section 284 gives district 
courts discretion in meting out enhanced damages.”59 
The frequency with which the Court relies on this rationale is 
perhaps overstated because it was invoked in three fundamentally 
important cases: eBay v. MercExchange, KSR v. Teleflex, and Teva 
v. Sandoz. In eBay, the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s 
“general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions against 
patent infringement absent exceptional circumstances.”60 This was 
also a case involving a statutory grant of discretion to the district 
court, Section 283 of the Patent Act, which the Court emphasized 
“expressly provides that injunctions ‘may’ issue ‘in accordance 
with the principles of equity.”61 The Supreme Court rejected the 
Federal Circuit’s general rule that an injunction must issue against 
                                                                                                             
54 Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1755. 
55 Highmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1749. 
56 Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1753. 
57 35 U.S.C. § 285 (emphasis added). 
58 Halo Electronics, 136 S. Ct at 1934. 
59 Id. at 1934 (discussing 35 U.S.C. § 284, which provides, in pertinent part, “the court 
may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.”  
(emphasis added)). 
60 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006). 
61 Id. at 392 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 283). 
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patent infringement because “the decision whether to grant or deny 
injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district 
court.”62 The eBay decision had a big impact on patent litigation,63 
with district courts granting injunctions much less frequently than 
before and routinely denying injunctions to non-practicing 
entities.64 
Two other fundamental decisions in which the Supreme Court 
reversed the Federal Circuit for its failure to grant sufficient 
discretion to the district court were KSR and Teva. In KSR, the 
Court altered the patent litigation landscape by liberalizing the 
Federal Circuit’s restrictive test for determining whether a patent 
was invalid for obviousness. The Court rejected the Federal 
Circuit’s rule in part because it was a “[r]igid preventative rule[] 
that den[ied] factfinders recourse to common sense” and other 
chains of reasoning.65 
And in Teva the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s rule that 
all aspects of district court claim construction be reviewed de novo, 
holding instead that factual determinations underlying claim 
construction rulings be reviewed for clear error.66 The Court 
reasoned that “clear error review is ‘particularly important’ where 
patent law is at issue because patent law ‘is a field where so much 
depends upon familiarity with specific problems and principles not 
                                                                                                             
62 Id. at 394. 
63 See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the 
Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 8 (2012) (“The Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in 
eBay represented a sea change in patent litigation.”); Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent 
Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 
1949 (2016) (“The Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in eBay v. MercExchange is widely 
regarded as one of the most important patent law rulings of the past decade.”). 
64 See, e.g., Chien & Lemley, supra note 63, at 9–10 (finding that “courts have granted 
about 75% of requests for injunctions, down from an estimated 95% pre-eBay” and that 
courts denied contested injunctions to non-practicing entities about 90% of the time); 
Seaman, supra note 63, at 1983, 1988 (finding that the injunction grant rate decreased to 
72–75%, “a decline from the state of play before eBay, when injunctions were granted to 
prevailing patentees in almost all cases,” and that non-practicing entities “rarely obtained 
a permanent injunction after prevailing on liability”). 
65 KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 428 (2007). 
66 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 843 (2015). 
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usually contained in the general storehouse of knowledge and 
experience.’”67 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court stands ready to correct the 
Federal Circuit when it fails to grant sufficient discretion to the 
district court and has done so in several fundamentally important 
cases. However, the Court has only cited this rationale in six of the 
twenty-eight cases since 2000 in which it reversed or vacated the 
Federal Circuit on patent law issues.68 
2. Cases in Which the Supreme Court Overruled the Federal 
Circuit for Imposing a Rigid Rule 
Scholars have noted a pattern of the Supreme Court rebuking 
the Federal Circuit for creating rigid rules where a flexible 
standard would be more appropriate.69 This reasoning often goes 
hand-in-hand with Rationale 1, the Federal Circuit’s failure to 
grant sufficient discretion to the district court, because the Federal 
Circuit’s inflexible rule improperly cabins the discretion of the 
district court. Specifically, the Supreme Court has cited Rationales 
1 and 2 together in at least four cases, which are discussed in the 
                                                                                                             
67 Id. at 838 (quoting Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 
610 (1950)). 
68 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (The Federal 
Circuit erred in part because “the decision whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests 
within the equitable discretion of the district courts.”); KSR Int’l. Co., 550 U.S. at 428 
(“Rigid preventive rules [with respect to the non-obviousness determination] that deny 
factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law 
nor consistent with it.”); Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
1749, 1758 (2014) (“The framework established by the Federal Circuit [for determining 
whether a case is exceptional under the Patent Act’s fee shifting provision]  . . .  is unduly 
rigid, and it impermissibly encumbers the statutory grant of discretion to district 
courts.”); Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1749 (2014) 
(“We therefore hold that an appellate court should apply an abuse-of-discretion standard 
in reviewing all aspects of a district court’s § 285 determination [of whether a case is 
‘exceptional’ and attorney fees should be awarded]”); Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
at 843 (holding that the court of appeals must apply a deferential “clear error” standard in 
reviewing factual determinations underlying district court claim constructions); Halo 
Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1935 (2016) (holding that the district 
court’s determination of whether to award enhanced damages for willful infringement 
must be reviewed for abuse of discretion). 
69 See sources cited supra note 37. 
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previous section.70 But the Court has invoked Rationale 2 in at 
least four additional cases for a total of eight such cases since 
2000.71 
In addition to KSR and eBay, discussed above,72 this category 
includes several additional fundamental cases that have been 
discussed extensively in the scholarly literature. In Festo v. 
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki, the Court addressed the 
doctrine of prosecution history estoppel. This doctrine provides 
that when a patent applicant “responds to [a] rejection by 
narrowing his claims, this prosecution history estops him from 
later arguing that the subject matter covered by the original, 
broader claim was nothing more than an equivalent.”73 The Federal 
Circuit had created an inflexible rule that, “by narrowing a claim to 
obtain a patent, the patentee surrenders all equivalents to the 
amended claim element.”74 The Court rejected this “per se rule,” 
holding that, even when the patent holder has made a narrowing 
                                                                                                             
70 See Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1935 (“Section 284 permits district courts to 
exercise their discretion in a manner free from the inelastic constraints of the Seagate 
test.”); Octane Fitness, LLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1758 (“The framework established by the 
Federal Circuit in Brooks Furniture is unduly rigid, and it impermissibly encumbers the 
statutory grant of discretion to the district courts.”); KSR Int’l. Co., 550 U.S. at 428 
(“Rigid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are 
neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it.”); eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 394 
(the Federal Circuit erred in creating a “general rule . . .  that a permanent injunction will 
issue once infringement and validity have been adjudged” in part because “the decision 
whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the 
district courts.”). 
71 See Mayo 132 S. Ct. at 1303 (noting that the Federal Circuit’s machine or 
transformation test is an important and useful clue to patentability, but “we have neither 
said nor implied that the test trumps the ‘law of nature’ exclusion.”); Illinois Tool Works 
Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 43 (2006) (holding that tying arrangements 
involving patented products should be assessed for antitrust violation under a flexible rule 
of reason standard rather than under a per se prohibition); Merck KGaA v. Integra 
Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 206 (2005) (There is no “categorical rule” that the 
Patent Act’s safe harbor provision allowing for experimental use related to the 
development and submission of information to the Food and Drug Administration 
excludes experimentation on drugs or use of compounds that are never submitted to the 
FDA); Festo, 535 U.S at 1840–41 (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s “categorical bar” on the 
application of the doctrine of equivalents in cases where patentees narrowed their claims 
during patent prosecution). 
72 See supra Section I.B.1. 
73 Festo, 535 U.S at 727. 
74 Id. 
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amendment, the court must examine the subject matter surrendered 
before determining whether the accused subject matter infringes 
the amended claim.75 The Court stated that it had “consistently 
applied the doctrine in a flexible way” and rejected “imposing a 
complete bar that resorts to the very literalism the equivalents rule 
is designed to overcome.”76 
Another important case in this category is Mayo v. Prometheus, 
in which the Supreme Court addressed the test for patent eligible 
subject matter.77 The Court had previously held, in Bilski v. 
Kappos, that the Federal Circuit had incorrectly decided that the 
exclusive test for determining the patent eligibility of a process 
was whether the claimed invention was tied to a particular machine 
or resulted in the transformation of matter.78 The Court stated that, 
while the “machine-or-transformation test” is a “useful and 
important clue,” the Federal Circuit erred in applying it rigidly as 
“the sole test for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible 
‘process.’”79 
In Mayo, the Court reversed the Federal Circuit for again 
rigidly applying this machine-or-transformation test to decide that 
a method for calibrating drug dosage was patent eligible.80 The 
Federal Circuit had held that, merely because the administration of 
drugs to a patient resulted in the transformation of blood taken 
from the patient’s body, there was a “transformation of matter,” 
and the claimed method was therefore patent eligible under the 
machine-or-transformation test.81 The Court rejected this 
unyielding application of the “machine-or-transformation” test, 
holding that, “in stating that the ‘machine-or-transformation’ test is 
an ‘important and useful clue’ to patentability, we have neither 
said nor implied that the test trumps the ‘law of nature’ 
                                                                                                             
75 Id. at 1840. 
76 Id. 
77 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012). 
78 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 603 (2010). Despite correcting the Federal Circuit’s 
rule, the Bilski case resulted in an affirmance by the Supreme Court, and is therefore not 
included in the twenty-eight cases that are the particular subject of this study of why the 
Supreme Court vacates or reverses the Federal Circuit. 
79 Id. at 604. 
80 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1296. 
81 Id. at 1296. 
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exclusion.”82 Once again, the Supreme Court faulted the Federal 
Circuit for doggedly applying a hard rule rather than flexible 
standards. 
This group of cases, Festo, Mayo, Bilski, KSR, and eBay, were 
widely discussed in patent scholarship because they worked 
fundamental changes in the law.83 Nonetheless, the reasoning they 
all share—that the Federal Circuit erred by applying an inflexible 
rule rather than a general standard—has only been relied upon by 
the Supreme Court in eight of the twenty-eight patent cases since 
2000 in which it has vacated or reversed the Federal Circuit.84 
3. Cases in Which the Supreme Court Overruled the Federal 
Circuit for Creating a Special Rule for Patent Law 
A third pattern noted by scholars is that the Supreme Court 
tends to overrule the Federal Circuit when it creates a special rule 
                                                                                                             
82 Id. at 1303 (quoting Bilski, 561 U.S.at 602–04) (emphasis in original). 
83 Westlaw searches of secondary sources citing to these cases reveal that Festo has 
been cited 1,431 times, Mayo 1,231 times, Bilski 1,734 times, KSR 2,018 times, and eBay 
3,346 times. (search last performed, Aug. 18, 2018). 
84 See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1935 (2016) (“Section 
284 permits district courts to exercise their discretion in a manner free from the inelastic 
constraints of the Seagate test.”); Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 
134 S. Ct. 1749, 1758 (2014) (“The framework established by the Federal Circuit in 
Brooks Furniture is unduly rigid, and it impermissibly encumbers the statutory grant of 
discretion to the district courts.”); KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 428 
(2007) (“Rigid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, 
however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it.”); eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (the Federal Circuit erred in creating a 
“general rule . . .  that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity 
have been adjudged” in part because “the decision whether to grant or deny injunctive 
relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district courts.”); Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 
1303 (noting that the Federal Circuit’s machine or transformation test is an important and 
useful clue to patentability, but “we have neither said nor implied that the test trumps the 
‘law of nature’ exclusion.”); Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc. 547 U.S 28, 43 
(2006) (holding that tying arrangements involving patented products should be assessed 
for antitrust violation under a flexible rule of reason standard rather than under a per se 
prohibition); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 208 (2005) 
(There is no “categorical rule” that the Patent Act’s safe harbor provision allowing for 
experimental use related to the development and submission of information to the Food 
and Drug Administration excludes experimentation on drugs or use of compounds that 
are never submitted to the FDA); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki 
Co., 535 U.S 722, 737–40 (2002) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s “categorical bar” on the 
application of the doctrine of equivalents in cases where patentees narrowed their claims 
during patent prosecution). 
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for patent law, rather than applying general equitable and legal 
principles.85 The Supreme Court has cited this rationale as a basis 
for reversing or vacating the Federal Circuit in nine out of twenty-
eight cases since 2000, making it the second most frequently cited 
rationale.86 In four of the cases this rationale is relied upon in 
connection with Rationale 1 (that the Federal Circuit failed to grant 
sufficient discretion to the district court) and/or Rationale 2 (that 
the Federal Circuit created an inflexible rule); this is because the 
rigid rule that failed to grant discretion to the district court was also 
a special rule the Federal Circuit created for patent law.87 
However, this rationale was cited in five additional cases as well.88 
                                                                                                             
85 See supra note 38. 
86 See SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 
954, 967 (2017) (the treatment of laches in a patent case should not be different from its 
treatment under the Copyright Act or depart from “this Court’s many reiterations of the 
general rule”); Halo, 136 S. Ct at 1933 (one problem with the Federal Circuit’s intent test 
for willful infringement is that “culpability is generally measured against the knowledge 
of the actor at the time of the challenged conduct”); Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., 
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1931 (2015) (holding that the defendant’s belief that a patent is 
invalid is not a defense to inducement of infringement because in tort law and criminal 
law an act can sometimes be intentional even if the actor lacks knowledge that the act is 
illegal); Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 843 (2015) (holding that 
the Federal Circuit’s refusal to give deference to factual determinations underlying claim 
construction violated the generally applicable FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6)); Octane Fitness, 
LLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1758 (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s rule that litigants establish 
entitlement to fees by clear and convincing evidence because “[w]e have not interpreted 
comparable fee-shifting statutes to require proof of entitlement to fees by clear and 
convincing evidence”); Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 571 U.S. 
191, 203 (2014) (the Federal Circuit was incorrect to put the burden of proof of 
infringement on the declaratory judgment plaintiff because it violated the general 
application of the Declaratory Judgment Act in non-patent cases); eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 
394 (the four factor test for granting permanent injunctions in other areas of law “apply 
with equal force to disputes arising under the Patent Act”); Holmes Group, Inc. v. 
Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 834 (2002) (rejecting the notion that the 
term “arising under” in the statute granting the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over 
patent appeals should be interpreted differently than that phrase is interpreted in other 
jurisdictional statutes); Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prod., Inc., 816 F.3d 721, 736 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (the Federal Circuit’s rule against international patent exhaustion 
violated general common law principles against restraints on alienation and improperly 
differentiated copyright exhaustion from patent exhaustion). 
87 See Halo, 136 S. Ct at 1933 (one problem with the Federal Circuit’s intent test for 
willful infringement is that “culpability is generally measured against the knowledge of 
the actor at the time of the challenged conduct”); Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.,135 S. Ct. at 
843 (holding that the Federal Circuit’s refusal to give deference to factual determinations 
underlying claim construction violated the generally applicable FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6)); 
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An important case applying this rationale is the Supreme 
Court’s recent patent exhaustion opinion, Impression Products v. 
Lexmark. One of the holdings in Impression Products is that the 
sale of a patented product overseas exhausts all U.S. patent rights 
in that product.89 In rejecting the Federal Circuit’s rule to the 
contrary, the Supreme Court reasoned that applying patent 
exhaustion to foreign sales was dictated by the common law’s 
“antipathy toward restraints on alienation.”90 The Court had 
already decided that U.S. copyright exhaustion was triggered by a 
foreign sale91 and decided that the same general common law 
principle applies to the Patent Act. Like copyright exhaustion, 
“[p]atent exhaustion, too, has its roots in the antipathy toward 
restraints on alienation[,] . . . and nothing in the text or history of 
the Patent Act shows that Congress intended to confine that 
borderless common law principle to domestic sales.”92 Rather, 
“differentiating the patent exhaustion and copyright first sale 
doctrines would make little theoretical or practical sense: ‘The two 
                                                                                                             
Octane Fitness, LLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1758 (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s rule that litigants 
establish entitlement to fees by clear and convincing evidence because “[w]e have not 
interpreted comparable fee-shifting statutes to require proof of entitlement to fees by 
clear and convincing evidence”); eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 394 (the four factor test for 
granting permanent injunctions in other areas of law “apply with equal force to disputes 
arising under the Patent Act”). 
88 See SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag, 137 S. Ct. 954, 967 (2017) (the treatment of 
laches in a patent case should not be different from its treatment under the Copyright Act 
or depart from “this Court’s many reiterations of the general rule”); Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 
816 F.3d at 736 (the Federal Circuit’s rule against international patent exhaustion 
violated general common law principles against restraints on alienation and improperly 
differentiated copyright exhaustion from patent exhaustion); Commil USA, LLC, 135 S. 
Ct. at 1931 (holding that the defendant’s belief that a patent is invalid is not a defense to 
inducement of infringement because in tort law and criminal law an act can sometimes be 
intentional even if the actor lacks knowledge that the act is illegal); Medtronic, Inc., 571 
U.S. at 203 (the Federal Circuit was incorrect to put the burden of proof of infringement 
on the declaratory judgment plaintiff because it violated the general application of the 
Declaratory Judgment Act in non-patent cases); Holmes Group, 535 U.S. at 834 
(rejecting the notion that the term “arising under” in the statute granting the Federal 
Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals should be interpreted differently than 
that phrase is interpreted in other jurisdictional statutes). 
89 Impression Prods. Inc. v. Lexmark Intern., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1536 (2017). 
90 Id. at 1536. 
91 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 525 (2013). 
92 Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 816 F.3d at 736. 
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share a ‘strong similarity . . . and identity of purpose.’”93 Hence, 
while the Federal Circuit creates special rules for patent law, the 
Supreme Court views the law as “borderless,” such that patent law 
should comply with general legal principles, whether they come 
from the common law or other areas of federal law, like the 
Copyright Act. 
Another example of this rationale appears in Commil, USA v. 
Cisco Systems, in which the Court held that a defendant’s belief 
that a patent was invalid did not constitute a defense to inducement 
of infringement.94 The Federal Circuit had held that “evidence of 
an accused infringer’s good-faith belief of invalidity may negate 
the requisite intent for induced infringement.”95 One of the reasons 
the Supreme Court concluded this was wrong was because it was 
contrary to the meaning of intent in tort law and criminal law. The 
Court reasoned that “[o]ur law is . . . no stranger to the possibility 
that an act may be ‘intentional’ for purposes of civil liability, even 
if the actor lacked actual knowledge that her conduct violated the 
law.”96 For example, in the context of tortious interference with 
contract, “[w]hile the invalidity of a contract is a defense to 
tortious interference, belief in invalidity is irrelevant.”97 And in 
criminal law, “[t]he general rule that ignorance of the law or a 
mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution is deeply 
rooted in the American legal system.”98 The Federal Circuit had 
again erred by creating a special rule for intent in the context of 
patent law, rather than looking to general principles of law in other 
subject areas. 
As a substantive matter, there are fundamentally important 
patent cases since 2000 in which the Supreme Court has relied on 
Rationales 1, 2, or 3 to overrule the Federal Circuit. From a strictly 
                                                                                                             
93 Id. at 1536 (quoting Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 13 (1913)). 
94 Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1931 (2015) 
95 Commil USA, LLC, 720 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoted in and vacated by 
Commil USA, LLC, 135 S. Ct. at 1925). 
96 Id. at 1930 (quoting Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, L.P.A., 
559 U.S. 573, 582–83 (2010)) (ellipses in original). 
97 Id. (citing, inter alia, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A, Comment i (1979); 
W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS 
110 (5th ed. 1984)). 
98 Id. (quoting Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991)). 
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numerical standpoint, however, by far the most common reason for 
the Supreme Court overruling the Federal Circuit is Rationale 
four—that the Federal Circuit disregarded Supreme Court 
precedent from prior to that court’s 1982 creation.99 
4. Cases in Which the Supreme Court Overruled the Federal 
Circuit for Disregarding or Cabining Supreme Court 
Precedent from Before 1982 
Despite the fact that patent law is theoretically a creature of 
statutory law, there are relatively few cases since 2000 in which 
the Court has relied purely on statutory construction to overrule the 
Federal Circuit.100 This is further evidence of Craig Allen Nard’s 
point that patent law is largely common law. Professor Nard 
writes: 
[T]he patent code, much like the Sherman Act, is a 
common law enabling statute, leaving ample room 
for courts to fill in the interstices or to create 
doctrine emanating solely from Article III’s 
                                                                                                             
99 See infra Section I.B.4 
100 Of the twenty-eight patent cases vacating or reversing the Federal Circuit since 
2000, only five cases did not rely on at least one of the four rationales discussed in this 
paper. Each of these other cases involved pure statutory interpretation without relying on 
the Federal Circuit’s failure to grant discretion to the district court, the improper creation 
of rigid rules or special rules for patent law, or the Federal Circuit’s disregard of Supreme 
Court precedent from prior to 1982. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1353 
(2018) (holding that under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a), the Patent Trial and Appeal Board must 
issue a final written decision addressing every patent claim challenged in an initial 
petition for inter parties review); Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1669 
(2017) (holding that the requirement of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation 
Act that a generic applicant provide the patent holder with its application and 
manufacturing information is not enforceable by an injunction under federal law; and that 
an applicant may provide notice of commercial marketing to the patent holder before, 
rather than after, the FDA licenses its biosimilar.); Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 
137 S. Ct. 734, 737 (2017) (holding that a single component of a multicomponent 
invention cannot constitute “all or a substantial portion” of the components supplied from 
the United States for combination abroad such as to impose infringement liability under 
35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1)); Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 432 (2016) 
(holding that the “article of manufacture” as used in 35 U.S.C. § 289 governing damages 
for design patent infringement can be a component of a product even if consumers cannot 
purchase the component separately); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 
566 U.S. 399, 426 (2012) (holding that under 21 U.S.C. § 355, a generic pharmaceutical 
manufacturer may assert a counterclaim in an infringement suit seeking correction of the 
branded pharmaceutical’s inaccurate use code). 
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province. Indeed, the common law has been the 
dominant legal force in the development of U.S. 
patent law for over two hundred years.101 
 This certainly appears to be how the contemporary Supreme 
Court views patent law. Of the twenty-eight patent law opinions 
reversing or vacating the Federal Circuit since 2000, twenty-one do 
so by relying, at least in part, on Supreme Court precedent from 
prior to the 1982 creation of the Federal Circuit; and most of the 
cases rely, at least in part, on precedent from prior to the 1952 
passage of the Patent Act.102 These numbers do not come from a 
                                                                                                             
101 Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 
51, 53 (2010). 
102 See WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2137 (2018) 
(relying on Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507 
(1964)); Impression Prods., v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1532–34, 1536 
(2017) (relying on United States v. Univis, 316 U.S. 241 (1942); Halo Elecs., Inc. v. 
Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1935 (2016) (rather than following the Federal 
Circuit’s new test for willful infringement, “district courts are ‘to be guided by[the] sound 
legal principles’ developed over nearly two centuries of application and interpretation of 
the Patent Act”) (quoting Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005) 
(referring, inter alia to Christianburg Garment Co. v. Equal Emp. Comm’n, 434 U.S. 
412, 422 (1978); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968))); TC 
Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1520 (2017) (relying 
on Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 226 (1957)); Commil 
USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1928 (2015) (“Allowing this new defense 
would also undermine a presumption that is a ‘common core of thought and truth’ 
reflected in this Court’s precedents for a century.”)) (quoting Radio Corp. of Am. v. 
Radio Eng’g Labs., Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 8 (1934)); SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First 
Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954, 963 (2017) (relying on Holmberg v. 
Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946); United States v. Mack, 295 U.S. 480, 489 (1935); 
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 837–38 (2015) (relying on 
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969); Nautilus, Inc. 
v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 913 (2014) (relying on United Carbon Co. v. 
Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942)); Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai 
Techs., Inc., 572 U.S. 915, 924 (2014) (relying on Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram 
Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 526–27 (1972); Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 
571 U.S. 191, 198 (2014) (relying on Imhaeuser v. Buerk, 101 U.S. 647, 662 (1880); 
Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 7 Wall. 583, 609 (1869)); Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health 
& Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 557 (2014) (reversing the Federal Circuit because it 
“abandoned that holistic, equitable approach” for determining whether a case is 
“exceptional” under 35 U.S.C. § 285 that had been applied by the lower courts “[f]or 
three decades after the [1952] enactment of § 285”) (internal citations omitted) (also 
relying on Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc. 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994); Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013) (relying on Funk Brothers 
Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 132 (1948)); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. 
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raw citation count of all cases cited by the Court in the relevant 
opinions. Rather, the author has considered those particular 
passages where the Supreme Court explains its reasoning to 
determine that the Federal Circuit erred. In these critical passages, 
the Court usually relies on its case law from prior to 1952.103 
                                                                                                             
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 79–81 (2012) (relying on Diamond v. Diehr, 450 
U.S. 175, 187 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585–87 (1978)); Quanta Comput., 
Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 628–29, 631 (2008) (relying on United States v. 
Univis, 316 U.S. 241 (1942); KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415–17 
(2007) (relying on Sakraida v. AG Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976)); MedImmune, 
Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 130–32 (2007) (relying on Altwater v. Freeman, 
319 U.S. 359, 364 (1943); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 392–93 
(2006) (relying on Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)); Microsoft Corp. 
v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 455 (2007) (relying on Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram 
Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972)); Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 
28, 42 (2006) (relying on United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610 
(1977)); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 738 
(2002) (relying on Hurlbut v. Schillinger, 130 U.S. 456, 465 (1889)); Holmes Group, Inc. 
v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002) (relying on The Fair v. Kohler 
Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 28 (1913)); Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183 (1856)); 
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 653 n. 8 (1983); Anderson’s Black 
Rock v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 62 (1969); Graham v. John Deere Co., 382 
U.S. 1, 12 (1966); United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 40 (1966); Aro Mfg. Co. v. 
Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507 (1964); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. 
Linde Air Prods., 339 U.S. 605, 610 (1950); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket 
Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152–53 (1950); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 
U.S. 436, 446 (1940); United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489 (1926); Boston 
Store of Chicago v. American Graphophone Co, 246 U.S. 8, 17–18 (1918); Motion 
Picture Patents v. Universal Film, 243 U.S. 502, 506–07 (1917); Straus v. Victor Talking 
Machine Co, 243 U.S. 490, 501 (1917); Minerals Separation, Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 
270 (1916); Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnel, 229 U.S. 1, 13 (1913); Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. 
Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 422–30 (1908); Dun v. Lumbermen’s Credit Ass’n., 209 
U.S. 20, 23–24 (1908); Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Davis, 102 U.S. 222, 230 
(1880); Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 661 (1895); Wehrman v. 
Conklin, 155 U.S. 314, 326 (1894); Hobbie v. Jennison, 149 U.S. 355, 362–63 (1893); 
Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 How. 539 (1853)); Cross v. Allen, 141 U.S. 528, 537 (1891); 
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 (1850). 
103 In this regard this study is of a different nature than Professor Joe Miller’s important 
work on citation counts in recent Supreme Court intellectual property decisions. See 
Joseph Scott Miller, Which Supreme Court Cases Influenced Recent Supreme Court IP 
Decisions? A Case Study, 21 UCLA J. L. & TECH. 1 (2017). Professor Miller’s citation 
counts indicate that “[t]he Court’s recent IP cases cite more recent Supreme Court cases 
more often than they cite older Supreme Court cases . . . .” Id. at 20. However, Professor 
Miller has studied all of the cases cited in i.p. opinions, not just those cases substantively 
relied upon in those passages of patent law opinions where the Court is explaining its 
reasoning. Id. at 18 (“I developed the citation list for each case by reading the entire 
opinion(s) . . . treating all portions of the cited opinion as on par with the others.”). In 
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Analysis of a few representative cases will demonstrate the 
Supreme Court’s methodology of correcting the Federal Circuit for 
failing to adhere to Supreme Court precedent from prior to 1952. 
In SCA Hygiene v. First Quality Baby Products, the Court held 
that laches cannot be asserted as a defense against damages 
occurring within the Patent Act’s six year limitations period.104 
The Patent Act has a somewhat peculiar statute of limitations in 
that it does not run forward from the date an infringement claim 
accrues. Rather, the statute imposes no time limit on when a claim 
for ongoing infringement may be brought, but bars recovery of 
damages occurring six years prior to the lawsuit: “Except as 
otherwise provided by law, no recovery shall be had for any 
infringement committed more than six years prior to the filing of 
the complaint or counterclaim for infringement in the action.”105 In 
1992, the Federal Circuit established the rule that even damages 
occurring within that six-year period could be barred by the 
equitable doctrine of laches.106 
The Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s approach 
because it departed from “the well-established rule, often repeated 
by this Court, that laches cannot be invoked to bar a claim for 
damages incurred within a limitations period specified by 
Congress.”107 The Court then proceeded to rely on four Supreme 
Court opinions from prior to the passage of the 1952 Patent Act 
that held that there can be no laches defense to a claim brought 
within the statute of limitations: cases from 1946, 1935, 1894, and 
                                                                                                             
fact, when Professor Miller calculates an “authority score” for I.P. cases cited by the 
Supreme Court, the results indicate that older cases generally have a higher authority 
score. Of the cases with the top ten authority scores, only one was issued later than 1982. 
Id. at 30. Of the cases with the top thirty-two authority scores, only eight were issued 
later than 1982. Id. 
104 SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954, 
959 (2017). 
105 35 U.S.C. § 286 (1999). 
106 A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1030 (1992) (en 
banc), reaff’d by SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods, 807 F.3d 
1311, 1322–24 (2015) (en banc), vacated by SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First 
Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954, 967 n. 8 (2017). 
107 SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag, 137 S. Ct. at 963. 
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1891.108 The Court chastised the Federal Circuit and the 
respondent for “dismiss[ing] the significance” of these Supreme 
Court opinions “because they were not made in patent cases.”109 
Relying again on Rationale 3 (that the Federal Circuit should not 
make special rules for patent law), the Court pointed out that 
“patent law is governed by the same common-law principles, 
methods of statutory interpretation, and procedural rules as other 
areas of civil litigation.”110 Moreover, these cases could not be 
disregarded on the basis that they preceded the passage of the 1952 
Patent Act. The Court held that “we are not convinced that 
Congress, in enacting § 282 of the Patent Act, departed from the 
general rule regarding the application of laches to damages 
suffered within the time for filing suit set out in a statute of 
limitations.”111 Hence, as even the dissent in SCA Hygiene 
conceded, “the 1952 Patent Act was primarily intended to codify 
existing law.”112 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has cautioned 
the Federal Circuit again and again that it should not disregard its 
precedent from prior to 1952.113 
Another important example is KSR v. Teleflex, where the 
Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s test for determining 
whether a patent is invalid for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 
103.114 The Federal Circuit had established a rule called “the 
‘teaching, suggestion, or motivation’ test (TSM test), under which 
a patent claim is only proved obvious if ‘some motivation or 
                                                                                                             
108 Id. (relying on Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946) (“If Congress 
explicitly puts a limit upon the time for enforcing a right which it created, there is an end 
of the matter”); United States v. Mack, 295 U.S. 480, 489 (1935) (“Laches within the 
term of the statute of limitations is no defense at law”); Wehrman v. Conklin, 155 U.S. 
314, 326 (1894) (“Though a good defense in equity, laches is no defense at law. If the 
plaintiff at law has brought his action within the period fixed by the statute of limitations, 
no court can deprive him of his right to proceed”); Cross v. Allen, 141 U.S. 528, 537 
(1891) (“So long as the demands secured were not barred by the statute of limitations, 
there could be no laches in prosecuting a suit”)). 
109 SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag, 137 S. Ct. at 964. 
110 Id. at 964 (quoting SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag, 137 S. Ct. at 1333 (Hughes, J., 
dissenting)). 
111 Id. at 966. 
112 Id. at 968 (citing Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923,  
1929–30 (2016). 
113 See sources cited supra note 102. 
114 KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415–17 (2007). 
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suggestion to combine the prior art teachings’ can be found in the 
prior art, the nature of the problem, or the knowledge of a person 
having ordinary skill in the art.”115 The Supreme Court rejected 
this rule as “unduly rigid” and because it failed to grant sufficient 
flexibility to the district court in making the obviousness 
determination (Rationales 1 and 2).116 
In doing so, however, the Court also relied on the fact that, 
“[t]hroughout this Court’s engagement with the question of 
obviousness, our cases have set forth an expansive and flexible 
approach inconsistent with the way the Court of Appeals applied 
the TSM test here.”117 The Court relied on its decision in Graham 
v. John Deere Company, which issued in 1966 and was the first 
Supreme Court opinion to interpret Section 103 of the new Patent 
Act.118 But the Court also relied on its precedent from before the 
passage of the Patent Act, including the 1850 decision in Hotchkiss 
v. Greenwood, which issued more than one hundred years before 
the passage of the 1952 Act, and the 1950 decision in Great 
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp.119 The 
Court explicitly stated that, despite the passage of the 1952 Act, 
“the principles laid down in Graham reaffirmed the ‘functional 
approach’ of Hotchkiss.”120 Hence, the first case interpreting the 
new statute did nothing more than to reaffirm the Court’s approach 
established more than one hundred years before the statute was 
passed. 
This is significant because one of the major innovations of the 
1952 Patent Act was to explicitly create, for the first time, an 
“obviousness” requirement for patentability.121 Judge Giles Rich, 
who helped to author the Patent Act and who was an original judge 
on the Federal Circuit, wrote in a 1966 law review article that, 
                                                                                                             
115 Id. at 407 (quoting Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1323–24 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999)). 
116 Id. at 415, 421–22. 
117 Id. at 415. 
118 Id. at 415 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 12 (1966)). 
119 Id. (citing Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 248 (1850); see Great Atl. & Pac. 
Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152–53 (1950)). 
120 Id. 
121 See Giles S. Rich, The Vague Concept of ‘Invention’ as Replaced by Sec. 103 of the 
1952 Patent Act, 46 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 855, 864 (1964). 
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prior to the 1952 Statute, the courts had developed a common law 
standard of “invention” which was inconsistent and unpredictable, 
a standard “which the courts pretended was being raised and 
lowered like an elevator as though it were something tangible.”122 
In Judge Rich’s opinion, this common law requirement was so 
unpredictable that it could not genuinely be called a “standard”: 
You really have to be on the Supreme Court to find 
a “standard” there because the only way it can work 
is this: if you [i.e., the Supreme Court] think the 
lower court was wrong in sustaining the patent, you 
proclaim that it applied too low a standard and 
reverse its decision, saying “That was not an 
‘invention.’”123 
To support this damning criticism, Judge Rich cited to none 
other than Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, one of the pre-
1952 cases the Supreme Court in KSR faulted the Federal Circuit 
for disregarding.124 In Great Atlantic, the Court found the patent-
in-suit was invalid, reversing the decision of the Sixth Circuit 
because “a standard of invention appears to have been used that is 
less exacting than that required where a combination is made up 
entirely of old components.”125 Moreover, as Judge Rich notes, the 
“invention” standard that he criticized as being unpredictable 
evolved out of the 1850 case, Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, the other 
pre-1952 case that the Supreme Court in KSR cites as continuing to 
define the non-obviousness requirement.126 What derived from this 
case “was an injection into the law of what has ever since been 
called the ‘requirement for invention,’” which, according to Judge 
Rich, became a results-oriented, unpredictable non-standard.127 
According to Judge Rich, the enactment of Section 103 of the 
Patent Act in 1952 was intended to replace the uncertain standard 
                                                                                                             
122 Id. at 861. 
123 Id. (emphasis in original). 
124 Id. at 861 n.15 (citing Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment 
Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950)). 
125 Great Atlantic, 340 U.S. 147, 154. 
126 Rich, supra note 121 at 859–60 (discussing Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S.  
248 (1851)). 
127 Id. at 860. 
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of “invention” with a more certain non-obviousness 
requirement128: 
This is not a “standard of invention” and it is not 
called a “requirement of invention.” The presence 
or absence of “invention” is not mentioned. The use 
of the term “invention” was, in fact, carefully 
avoided with a view to making a fresh start, free of 
all the divergent court opinions and rhetorical 
pronouncements about “invention.” And in doing 
that it was contemplated, as the House Report 
states, that “This section should have a stabilizing 
effect and minimize great departures which have 
appeared in some cases.”129 
Judge Rich states that “[t]he addition of section 103 was stated 
in the House Report on the bill to be one of the two major changes 
or innovations in the statute.”130 The new obviousness requirement 
would solve the “vice or inadequacy of the judge made 
requirement for ‘invention.’”131 
And yet in KSR, in correcting the Federal Circuit’s application 
of the obviousness requirement, the Supreme Court returned to its 
“judge made,” pre-1952 precedent. The Court rejected the Federal 
Circuit’s stringent, rigid test for obviousness and reaffirmed “the 
functional approach of Hotchkiss.”132 And the Court made plain 
that 
[n]either the enactment of § 103 nor the analysis in 
Graham disturbed this Court’s earlier instructions 
concerning the need for caution in granting a patent 
based on the combination of elements found in the 
prior art. For over half a century, the Court has held 
that a “patent for a combination which only unites 
                                                                                                             
128 Id. at 864–65. 
129 Id. (citing House Report No. 1923, 82th Cong. 2d Sess., to accompany H.R. 7794, 
pg. 5 and also stating that “[t]he writer speaks from personal knowledge as one of the 
drafters [of Section 103].”). 
130 Id. at 864 (emphasis in original). 
131 Id. at 865. 
132 KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted). 
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old elements with no change in their respective 
functions . . . obviously withdraws what already is 
known into the field of its monopoly and diminishes 
the resources available to skillful men.”133 
For the Supreme Court, the 1952 Patent Act merely codified its 
precedent.134 For example, the Court has stated that the Act “left 
intact the entire body of case law on direct infringement.”135 It is 
therefore usually error for the Federal Circuit to disregard and 
cabin the Supreme Court’s pre-1952 precedent. The Supreme 
Court has relied on this reasoning again and again. It has been the 
most common rationale for the Supreme Court to reverse the 
Federal Circuit in patent cases since the year 2000.136 
C. The Supreme Court’s Project of Patent Reform to Favor 
Accused Infringers 
We are confronted with a situation where the Supreme Court is 
accepting an unprecedented number of patent cases,137 is reversing 
the Federal Circuit at a relatively high rate,138 and is doing so by 
reaffirming its precedent from prior to the 1952 passage of the 
Patent Act.139 This raises the question: What is the Supreme Court 
doing to patent law substantively? 
The inescapable conclusion is that the Supreme Court is 
engaged in an ongoing project of patent litigation reform to favor 
accused infringers. First, as a purely numeric matter, of the forty-
one substantive patent law opinions the Supreme Court has issued 
since 2000, the majority of cases establish a rule to favor accused 
infringers. Specifically, twenty-four opinions favor accused 
                                                                                                             
133 Id. at 415–16 (quoting Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 
U.S. 147, 152–53 (1950)). 
134 See, e.g., Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 505 
n.20 (1964) (referring to “the 1952 codification” of contributory infringement law). 
135 Id. at 602; see also Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 26 
(1997) (“In the context of infringement, we have already held that pre-1952 precedent 
survived the passage of the 1952 Act.”). 
136 See sources cited supra note 102. 
137 See supra Part I. 
138 See supra Part I. 
139 See supra Section I.B.4 
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infringers,140 eleven opinions favor patent holders,141 and six 
opinions favor neither party.142 
                                                                                                             
140 The twenty-four cases establishing a rule to favor accused infringers are: Oil States 
Energy v. Greene’s Energy, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1370 (2018) (holding that inter partes 
review does not violate Article III or the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution); 
Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1669, 1677 (2017) (holding that the 
requirement of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act that an applicant 
provide a sponsor with its application and manufacturing information is not enforceable 
by federal injunction; and an applicant need not provide notice of commercial marketing 
to the sponsor until after the FDA licenses its biosimilar); Impression Prods., v. Lexmark 
Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1529, 1535 (2017) (holding that a patent holder’s decision to 
sell a product exhausts all patent rights in that item regardless of any contractual 
restrictions the patent holder purports to impose; and the sale of a product overseas 
triggers patent exhaustion); TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. 
Ct. 1514, 1517 (2017) (holding that a domestic corporation “resides” only in its State of 
incorporation for purposes of satisfying the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b)); 
Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 137 S. Ct. 734, 737 (2017) (holding that a single 
component of a multicomponent invention cannot constitute “all or a substantial portion” 
of the components supplied from the United States for combination abroad such as to 
impose infringement liability under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1)); Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple 
Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 436 (2016) (holding that the “article of manufacture” as used in 35 
U.S.C. § 289 governing damages for design patent infringement can be a component of a 
product even if consumers cannot purchase the component separately); Cuozzo Speed 
Techs. LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2141, 2144–45 (2016) (holding that a PTO 
determination to institute inter parties review is final and non-appealable; and the PTO 
may apply the broadest reasonable claim construction in conducting inter parties review); 
Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2405 (2015) (on certiorari to the Ninth 
Circuit) (holding that “a patent holder cannot charge royalties for his invention after its 
patent term has expired”); Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2351 
(2014) (holding that a particular business method patent was invalid for failing to recite 
patentable subject matter); Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 913 
(2014) (holding that a patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the 
specification and prosecution history, fail to inform a person of ordinary skill in the art 
with reasonable certainty what is the scope of the patented invention); Limelight 
Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 572 U.S. 915, 915, 918 (2014) (holding that there 
is no claim for inducement of infringement where there is no underlying direct 
infringement; hence, where no single entity performs all steps of a claimed method, such 
that there is no direct infringement under Federal Circuit precedent, there is no claim for 
inducement of infringement); Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 571 
U.S. 191, 194 (2014) (holding that in a suit for declaratory judgment of non-
infringement, the burden of proving infringement remains with the patent holder 
defendant); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 580 
(2013) (holding that claims to isolated DNA segments recited phenomena of nature and 
were therefore not patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101); F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 570 
U.S. 136, 141 (2013) (on certiorari to the Eleventh Circuit) (holding that reverse 
settlement payments, whereby a branded pharmaceutical company pays a generic 
company royalties to keep the generic product off the market until the patent expires, can 
violate the antitrust laws); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 566 U.S. 399, 
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404 (2012) (holding that a generic pharmaceutical manufacturer may assert a 
counterclaim in an infringement suit seeking correction of the branded pharmaceutical’s 
inaccurate use code); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 
1289, 1294 (2012) (holding that patents claiming methods for calibrating the proper 
dosage of a particular drug claimed laws of nature and were therefore invalid pursuant to 
35 U.S.C. § 101 for lack of eligible subject matter); Global-Tech Appliances v. SEB 
S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 757, 766 (2011) (holding that inducement of infringement requires 
actual knowledge that the accused acts constituted infringement (or willful blindness to 
that fact); constructive knowledge is insufficient)); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604, 
607 (2010) (holding that a patent claiming a particular business method was not patent 
eligible; and that the machine-or-transformation test is not the exclusive test for patent 
eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101); Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 
638 (2008) (holding that where a patent holder authorizes a licensee to sell articles that 
substantially embody patented methods, the patent rights in those articles are exhausted); 
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 441–42 (2007) (35 U.S.C. § 271(f) 
provides for infringement liability where a person “supplies . . . from the United States,” 
for “combination” abroad, a patented invention’s “components.” The Court held that 
where the accused “component” was software, infringement liability was only incurred 
for supply of the disks containing the software, not for each copy of the software made 
from those disks overseas); KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 407 (2007) 
(holding that the Federal Circuit incorrectly reversed the District Court’s judgment that 
the patent-in-suit was invalid as obvious based on an overly rigid rule contrary to the 
Court’s precedent); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007) 
(holding that a patent licensee is not required to terminate or breach its license in order to 
seek declaratory judgment of patent invalidity); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 
U.S. 388, 390, 394 (2006) (holding that the decision to grant or deny a permanent 
injunction is within the equitable discretion of the district court applying the four-factor 
test applicable to all federal cases); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 
193, 206 (2005) (holding that the exemption from patent infringement for uses of 
patented inventions in a manner reasonably related to the development and submission of 
information to the Food and Drug Administration does not categorically exclude 
experiments on drugs where neither the drugs nor the experiments are ultimately the 
subject of an FDA submission). 
141 The eleven cases establishing a rule to favor patent holders are: WesternGeco LLC 
v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2134 (2018) (holding that a patent holder 
may collect lost profits damages based on loss of foreign sales when claiming 
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)); SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality 
Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954, 967 (2017) (holding that laches cannot be asserted as a 
defense against damages occurring within the Patent Act’s six year limitations period); 
Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1934 (2016) (holding that the 
Federal Circuit’s tri-partite test for enhanced damages for willful infringement was 
incorrect and inconsistent with the district court’s discretion to grant enhanced damages); 
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1928 (2015) (holding that the 
accused infringer’s belief that the patent was invalid is not a defense to the knowledge 
element of a claim of induced infringement); Bowman v. Monsanto, 569 U.S. 278, 289 
(2013) (holding that Monsanto’s patent rights were not exhausted in patented seeds a 
farmer reproduced through planting and harvesting); Kappos v. Hyatt, 566 U.S. 431, 
433–34 (2012) (holding that when a patent applicant files a civil action in the district 
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To be clear, this is not a count of the number of cases where 
the patent holder or the accused infringer necessarily won the 
appeal in the Supreme Court. Rather, this is a count of the number 
of cases where the Supreme Court’s opinion established a rule to 
favor patent holders or accused infringers going forward. For 
example, in SAS Institute v. Iancu, the victorious petitioner in the 
                                                                                                             
court pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 145 to challenge the denial of a patent application, the 
patent applicant may introduce new evidence before the district court and the district 
court must make de novo factual findings based on the new evidence); Microsoft Corp. v. 
i4i Ltd., 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011) (holding that a patent must be proven invalid by clear and 
convincing evidence); Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche 
Molecular Sys., 563 U.S. 776, 780 (2011) (holding that the Business Patent Procedures 
Act of 1980 does not automatically vest title to federally funded inventions in federal 
contractors); Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 46 (2006) (holding 
that in order to prove an illegal tying arrangement involving a patented product, the 
plaintiff must prove the defendant has market power in the tying product, and the 
existence of the patent does not give rise to a presumption of market power); Festo Corp. 
v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736–37, 741, 740 (2002) 
(holding that prosecution history estoppel may apply to any claim amendment made to 
satisfy patentability requirements; a claim amendment does not operate as an absolute bar 
to the doctrine of equivalents; rather, the patent holder has the burden of proving that the 
particular equivalent was not surrendered); J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred 
Int’l Inc., 534 U.S. 127, 132 (2001) (holding that Utility patents may be granted for plants 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101; and that the Plant Variety Protection Act and the Plant Patent Act 
of 1930 are not the exclusive means for obtaining patent protection for plants). 
142 The six cases establishing a rule that could favor either party in a given case are: 
SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354 (2018) (holding that the Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board must issue a final written decision addressing every patent claim 
challenged in an initial petition for inter partes review); Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. 
Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015) (holding that findings of fact underlying a 
district court’s claim construction opinion must be reviewed for clear error); Highmark 
Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 572 U.S. 559, 564 (2014) (holding that all aspects of 
district court determinations under the Patent Act’s fee shifting provision (35 U.S.C. § 
285) are reviewed for abuse of discretion); Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & 
Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 557 (2014) (holding that the test for whether a case is 
“exceptional” under 35 U.S.C. § 285 to allow for the awarding of attorney’s fees is that 
the case stands out from other cases with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s 
litigating position or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated; patent 
litigants are not required to establish entitlement to fees by a heightened clear and 
convincing evidence standard); Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 264–65 (2013) (on 
certiorari to the Supreme Court of Texas) (holding that a legal malpractice claim 
requiring the resolution of a substantive question of patent law was not subject to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts); Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air 
Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 834 (2002) (holding that the Federal Circuit does not 
have appellate jurisdiction over a case based solely on the answer containing a patent  
law counterclaim). 
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Supreme Court was a party accused of patent infringement who 
instituted an inter partes review in the PTO to challenge the 
validity of the patent.143 SAS Institute won its appeal in the 
Supreme Court, convincing the Court to establish a rule that, when 
the PTO initiates an inter partes review, it must issue a final 
written decision on all of the patent claims challenged in the 
petitioner’s initial petition, even those patent claims about which 
the PTO concludes there is no “reasonable likelihood that the 
petitioner would prevail” in establishing invalidity.144 SAS 
Institute won the Supreme Court appeal and will be entitled to a 
final decision by the PTO in all of the patent claims it challenged, 
but this will not necessarily assist accused infringers going 
forward: if the PTO is forced to reach a decision on patent claims 
about which it initially concluded there was no reasonable 
likelihood of being proven invalid, the chances are that the PTO 
will issue a final decision that those claims are, in fact, valid. 
Because the pertinent statute provides that “[t]he petitioner in an 
inter partes review of a claim in a patent . . . that results in a final 
written decision . . . may not assert either in a civil action . . . or in 
[an ITC proceeding] that the claim is invalid on any ground that 
the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during that 
inter partes review,” this will result in estopping the accused 
infringer from attempting to invalidate those claims in a 
subsequent infringement case in the district court.145 Accordingly, 
whereas before the Court’s opinion in SAS Institute the PTO was 
free to issue final written decisions only on those claims about 
which it found a reasonable likelihood of invalidity, now it must 
issue final written opinions on all claims challenged in the initial 
petition, which will often result in the accused infringer being 
estopped from challenging the validity of claims in subsequent 
litigation. Even though the accused infringer won in SAS Institute, 
the rule established in that case will not necessarily help accused 
infringers. 
                                                                                                             
143 SAS Inst., Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 1354. 
144 Id. at 1354–53. 
145 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) (2011). 
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Below is a pie chart illustrating this author’s assessment of the 
number of Supreme Court patent law cases since 2000 establishing 
a rule to favor accused infringers, patent holders, or neither. 
FIGURE 4: NUMBER OF SUPREME COURT PATENT CASES SINCE 
2000 ESTABLISHING A RULE TO FAVOR PATENT HOLDERS, ACCUSED 
INFRINGERS, OR NEITHER PARTY. 
 
More important than these numbers, however, is the 
importance of the fundamental reforms the Supreme Court has 
made to patent law since 2000 to favor accused infringers. These 
include the following: 
 The Court made it far more difficult to obtain 
patent injunctions, particularly for non-
practicing entities, by eliminating the Federal 
Circuit’s rule that the district court must issue an 
injunction against infringement;146 
 The Court expanded the availability to licensees 
of declaratory judgment actions challenging the 
validity of the licensed patent147 and put the 
                                                                                                             
146 See eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 394. 
147 See MedImmune, Inc., 549 U.S. at 137. 
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burden of proving infringement on the patent 
holder in declaratory judgment actions;148 
 The Court made it easier to prove a patent 
invalid for obviousness by making the standard 
more flexible;149 
 The Court revitalized the defense of patent 
exhaustion, whereby a patent holder may not 
chase a patented product down the stream of 
commerce, accusing each subsequent user of 
infringement after an authorized first sale;150 
 The Court gave teeth to the doctrine of patent 
ineligible subject matter, making it easier to 
invalidate patents on the basis that they 
improperly claim abstract ideas, natural 
phenomena, or rules of nature;151 
 The Court made it easier to prove a patent 
invalid for claim indefiniteness, making the test 
less stringent and difficult to prove;152 
 The Court reinterpreted the patent venue statute, 
making it more difficult for plaintiffs to forum 
shop;153 
 The Court affirmed the constitutionality of the 
new PTO inter partes review proceedings, 
which provide a less expensive forum for 
accused infringers to challenge patent validity, 
thereby reducing settlement pressure;154 
                                                                                                             
148 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 571 U.S. 191, 203 (2014). 
149 See KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415–22 (2007). 
150 See Impression Prods., v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1529 (2017); Quanta 
Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 621 (2008). 
151 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 580 
(2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70–73 (2012); 
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354–59 (2014); Bilski v. 
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602–06 (2010). 
152 See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 913 (2014). 
153 See TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1517 
(2017). 
154 See Oil States Energy v. Greene’s Energy, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1370 (2018). 
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 The Court narrowly construed statutes providing 
remedies for international infringement and for 
indirect infringement;155 and 
 The Court issued multiple decisions favoring the 
availability of generic pharmaceuticals and 
adverse to patent-holding branded 
pharmaceutical companies.156 
These and other reforms the Supreme Court has made are far 
more impactful than any legislative reforms Congress has managed 
to enact to relieve accused infringers from the patent thicket and 
non-practicing entities.157 There can be no doubt that we are living 
through an era of Supreme Court patent litigation reform to favor 
accused infringers. 
                                                                                                             
155 See Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 137 S. Ct. 734, 741 (2017); Limelight 
Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 572 U.S. 915, 924 (2014); Microsoft Corp. v. 
AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 442 (2007). 
156 See Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1674 (2017); F.T.C. v. Actavis, 
Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 140–41 (2013); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 566 
U.S. 399, 403–04 (2012); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 
202–08 (2005). 
157 Colleen V. Chien, Patent Amicus Briefs: What the Courts’ Friends Can Teach Us 
About the Patent System, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 397, 398 (2011) (“Over the last two 
decades, the courts have become the primary source of patent law and policy. During the 
half decade or so that Congressional patent reform was pending, the Federal Circuit and 
Supreme Court reshaped the laws governing innovation in the United States by deciding 
what can be patented, the scope of patent rights, and the remedies to which patentees are 
entitled.”) (internal citations omitted). The possible exception is Congress’s creation of 
new PTO proceedings to reexamine the validity of issued patents, which has provided a 
less expensive forum for accused infringers to challenge asserted patents. See generally 
Timothy B. Dyk & Samuel F. Ernst, Patents, BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN 
FEDERAL COURTS § 98:7 (Robert L. Haig, ed. 4th ed. 2016) (discussing 35 U.S.C. §§ 
311–19 (inter parties review proceedings); §§ 321–29 (post-grant review proceedings)). 
However, even with respect to this reform, the constitutional validity of these 
proceedings had to be safeguarded by the Supreme Court. See Oil States Energy v. 
Greene’s Energy, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1370 (2018). 
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II. PRECEDENT VITALITY AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON THE 
SUPREME COURT 
A. The Supreme Court Has Been Influenced in Its Unstated Policy 
of Patent Litigation Reform by External Influences 
At this point an objection might be raised: The Supreme Court 
doesn’t pursue policy objectives. In the words of Chief Justice 
Roberts at his confirmation hearing, “I have no agenda . . . [I]t’s 
my job to call balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat.”158 
In fact, various Supreme Court scholars in studies across many 
decades have concluded that “the justices’ policy preferences are 
the primary determinant of their votes on the merits of cases.”159 In 
addition, various studies have demonstrated that the justices’ 
policy preferences affect their votes on certiorari petitions.160 The 
view that the justices are guided by their policy preferences is not 
controversial. Rather, “judicial specialists generally agree that 
justices, first and foremost, wish to see their policy preferences 
etched into law. They are, in the eyes of many, ‘single-minded 
seekers of legal policy.’”161 In this regard, the justices vote not 
merely to determine the outcome of the particular case at hand. As 
Thomas G. Hansford and James F. Spriggs write: 
Instead, [the justices] endeavor to create legal 
policy that will actually influence legal and 
extralegal outcomes in the intended manner. Justice 
Vinson suggested as much when he wrote: “What 
                                                                                                             
158 Roberts, ‘My Job Is to Call Balls And Strikes and Not to Pitch or Bat’, CNN (Sept. 
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the Court is interested in is the actual, practical 
effect of the disputed decision—its consequences 
for other litigants and in other situations.” In other 
words, the justices care about the ultimate effect of 
the legal policy they set. The justices recognize that 
the legal rules or precedents established in the 
Court’s majority opinions represent their most 
important tool for influencing social, political, and 
economic outcomes. Their behavior on the bench is 
therefore principally motivated by the distributional 
consequences of their opinions, and they want these 
consequences to reflect their preferences.162 
This all may be true with respect to controversial issues in 
constitutional law and criminal procedure, but is it really true with 
respect to patent law? Mark Tushnet has attempted to puzzle this 
out in the context of a conservative Supreme Court taking a lot of 
patent cases. Tushnet observes that “[p]opulist Democrats used to 
try to keep the scope of patents narrow. They thought that patents 
gave people monopolies (mostly true), and that monopolies were 
bad for consumers (mostly true, too).”163 Why, then, would a 
conservative Supreme Court be engaged in a project of weakening 
patent rights? Professor Tushnet argues that 
[t]he high-tech revolution changed how patents fit 
into the political system, as suggested by the 
common observation that Democrats get a lot of 
political contributions from people in high-tech 
industries. The new view of patents is that they 
encourage creativity. The image of the inventor in 
the garage behind the house isn’t entirely accurate, 
but it captures the idea that patents are good for a 
certain class of small businesses.164 
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If this is true, then maybe the conservative Supreme Court is 
now anti-patent because Democrats are aligned with the high-tech 
industry, which is pro-patent. 
But Professor Tushnet has it all wrong. The high-tech industry 
in Silicon Valley has for many years been advocating for patent 
reform to weaken patent rights because of the plague of non-
practicing entities imposing a tax on innovation.165 There is a view 
in the high-tech industry and among many scholars that patents 
impede, rather than encourage, true innovation.166 Accordingly, 
even if Tushnet is correct that Democrats are aligned with the 
Silicon Valley high-tech industry, this would appear to result in an 
anti-patent bias, not a pro-patent bias. 
Moreover, the image of the sole inventor in his garage 
laboratory battling large corporations that have stolen his invention 
is not at all accurate anymore, if it even ever was.167 Rather, “small 
companies, consumers, and nonprofits—are increasingly being 
dragged into the world of high-priced patent litigation.”168 And 
“the majority of non-practicing entity lawsuits are filed against 
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small businesses with revenues under $10 million.”169 
Accordingly, Tushnet is incorrect when he asks us 
to imagine a case in which liberals vote to uphold a 
patent because they think that consumers as little 
guys are going to gain a lot from being able to buy 
the new device, and conservatives vote to uphold it 
because they like big businesses that typically are 
the ones who get the patented item to the larger 
market.170 
In fact, the picture is more nuanced: patents often hurt 
consumers as well as large and small high-tech businesses and 
generic pharmaceutical companies while helping branded 
pharmaceutical companies.171 Against this background, 
conservative and liberal justices alike are nonetheless largely 
voting to weaken patent rights, not strengthen them, and hinder 
branded pharmaceutical companies in cases with very few 
dissenting opinions.172 
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Perhaps because of this peculiar phenomenon at the Supreme 
Court, Tushnet throws up his hands and concludes: 
No one knows enough about the effects of patent 
law on innovation and marketing to be sure who’s 
going to benefit from decisions making it easier or 
harder to get valid patents. In general, the justices 
are simply going to try to build the best—that is, the 
most legally defensible—body of patent law they 
can try.173 
But there is a vast literature studying the effects of patent law on 
innovation and marketing.174 And the justices are not simply 
struggling to say something legally defensible about patent law. As 
demonstrated quantitatively and qualitatively above, the Supreme 
Court is pursuing a concerted policy of patent litigation reform to 
favor accused infringers.175 
But why? What would unify liberal and conservative justices 
alike to pursue a policy of patent reform? The solution might be 
that the policy being pursued is not influenced so much by politics 
in the traditional liberal versus conservative model. Rather, the 
justices are influenced in patent law decisions by external 
pressures that are largely unrelated to Democratic versus 
Republican politics. 
Jeffrey Segal has conducted a study demonstrating that the 
Supreme Court is largely unconstrained by the pressures on 
political actors in the other branches.176 This stands to reason, 
because “[t]hough it is true that Congress can overrule the Court 
by passing ordinary legislation, the difficulty of passing override 
legislation combined with the even greater difficulty of the Court’s 
knowing whether that would happen creates an environment in 
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which members of the Court can rationally vote their sincere 
policy preferences.”177 Hence, the justices’ decision-making does 
not blow in the storm of Democratic versus Republican politics, as 
it does in the other branches. Nonetheless, “Justices, like most 
politically sophisticated adults, have preferences of policy and 
presumably derive greater utility when those preferences are 
written into law than when they are not.”178 But because of their 
judicial independence, Justices can pursue their preferred policies 
steadfastly, without being swayed directly by such ephemeral 
matters as whether Silicon Valley or the pharmaceutical industry is 
giving more money to Republicans or Democrats. Hence, “[t]he 
federal courts were designed to be independent; we should not be 
surprised that they are capable of actually being independent.”179 
Nonetheless, “[n]o man is an island, entire of itself; every man 
is a piece of the continent, a part of the main.”180 So too with the 
women and men on the Supreme Court. If the justices, as Segal 
argues, are not generally influenced by shifting partisan political 
winds; and if, in the area of patent law, the justices do not appear 
influenced by their steadfast liberal or conservative ideologies as 
they may be in other areas of law; then what external pressures 
influence their decision-making? Charles R. Epp argues that the 
Court’s agenda is influenced by concentrated external pressures 
coming from the legal field.181 First, “[t]he justices have developed 
an institutionalized reluctance to decide issues that have 
‘percolated’ little in lower courts.”182 Accordingly, “the available 
options for a place on the agenda are limited to those issues on 
which there is sustained litigation in lower courts.”183 Second, 
“[t]he political economy of litigation—particularly the availability 
of resources for litigation—determines the extent to which there is 
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sustained litigation on any particular issue.”184 From these facts, it 
follows that the Court’s agenda is “dependent on a support 
structure for legal mobilization, consisting of lawyers, 
organizations, and sources of financing, that makes sustained 
litigation possible.”185 Hence, when there are sustained litigation 
campaigns in the lower court by business interests in favor of large 
corporations, the Court is influenced to take up such cases and shift 
the law in favor of corporations.186 As another example, when 
there are sustained litigation campaigns in the lower courts by 
rights-advocacy organizations, the Court is influenced to take up 
these types of cases and reform the law in this direction.187 
Epps takes as one example the pro-business litigation 
campaigns of the 1900s-1920s, which resulted in conservative, 
pro-business decisions.188 He takes as another example the 
litigation campaigns undertaken by rights-advocacy groups such as 
the ACLU, the American Jewish Congress, and the NAACP in the 
1950s-1970s, which resulted in Supreme Court legal reform in the 
area of civil rights.189 In a similar vein, Lee Epstein and Jack 
Knight have demonstrated that the Court is often influenced to 
pursue an agenda in areas of law where there have been extensive 
amicus curiae campaigns.190 
All of these phenomena have coalesced in the area of patent 
law this decade. There has been an increase in patent lawsuits 
being filed in the last ten years, although the number has declined 
slightly recently due to more patents being challenged in inter 
partes review proceedings.191 In particular, a large number of cases 
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have been brought by non-practicing entities,192 and this has caught 
the attention of the legal academy and of the mainstream press.193 
In fact, the problem of non-practicing entities has caught the 
explicit attention of the Supreme Court, as demonstrated by Justice 
Kennedy’s famous concurrence in the eBay opinion, in which he 
opined that non-practicing entities would seldom be able to 
demonstrate entitlement to a permanent injunction against patent 
infringement.194 High tech companies have undertaken extensive 
litigation campaigns in an effort to reform patent law.195 There has 
been a marked increase in the number of amicus briefs filed in 
patent appeals both before the Federal Circuit and the Supreme 
Court.196 
Accordingly, it appears to have been these pressures from 
within the legal community that have influenced the Supreme 
Court to undertake its prolonged project of patent litigation reform. 
B. The Supreme Court Affects its Unstated Policy of Patent 
Litigation Reform Through Precedent Vitality 
What methodology has the Court used to pursue its policy of 
patent litigation reform? As demonstrated above, the most 
common rationale relied upon by the Supreme Court in overruling 
the Federal Circuit has been that the Federal Circuit disregarded or 
cabined Supreme Court precedent from prior to the Patent Act of 
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1952 or from prior to the 1982 creation of the Federal Circuit.197 In 
light of general Supreme Court scholarship on stare decisis and 
“precedent vitality,” it is not surprising that the Court has followed 
this strategy. 
Alexander Hamilton famously wrote 
[t]he judiciary . . . has no influence over either the 
sword or the purse; no direction either of the 
strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take 
no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said 
to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely 
judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid 
of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its 
judgments.198 
Accordingly, as many have observed, judges rely solely on 
institutional and decisional legitimacy to encourage compliance 
with their rulings.199 In order to achieve this legitimacy, Hamilton 
argued that “it is indispensable that [judges] should be bound down 
by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out 
their duty in every particular case that comes before them.”200 
Accordingly, the judiciary relies on the principal of stare decisis: 
This doctrine is simply that, when a point or 
principle of law has been once officially decided or 
settled by the ruling of a competent court in a case 
in which it is directly and necessarily involved, it 
will no longer be considered as open to examination 
or to a new ruling by the same tribunal, or by those 
which are bound to follow its adjudications.201 
Even the Supreme Court is bound by stare decisis to preserve 
the legitimacy of its decisions. Although the Court is free to 
overrule its prior decisions, it purports to set forth objective 
guidelines for determining when that is appropriate. Hence, the 
Court wrote in Planned Parenthood v. Casey that it considers 
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whether the rule [of the precedent in question] has 
proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical 
workability; whether the rule is subject to a kind of 
reliance that would lend a special hardship to the 
consequences of overruling and add inequity to the 
cost of repudiation; whether related principles of 
law have so far developed as to have left the old 
rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine; 
or whether facts have so changed, or come to be 
seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of 
significant application or justification.202 
Hence, the Court has made explicit that stare decisis is a flexible 
doctrine; it is not “inexorable command.”203 
But even when the Court is not overruling its precedent and 
purports to be following precedent faithfully, stare decisis is a very 
flexible tool to shape the law. This is because of the tool of 
“precedent vitality.” Supreme Court opinions vary in their vitality. 
Hanford and Spriggs write, “[s]ome precedents are more legally 
authoritative than others and thus have an enhanced ability to 
justify and legitimize the justices’ policy choices.”204 But it is not 
the age of the precedent that determines its vitality or even 
particularly the factors mentioned by the Court in Planned 
Parenthood for overruling a case.205 Rather, Hanford and Spriggs 
argue that “the vitality of precedent . . . derive[s] from the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of it in other cases.”206 Hence, while 
appearing to apply its precedent faithfully, the Supreme Court can 
enhance or decrease the vitality of its precedent in various ways. 
The Court may apply the rationale of one of its opinions to new 
facts; it may expand the rationale of one of its opinions; or it may 
distinguish its precedent or limit it to its particular facts or even 
ignore a particular case altogether. By these methods, “the decision 
to interpret precedent is driven by the desire to influence the scope 
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and meaning of existing precedent and the goal of legitimizing new 
legal policy.”207 
This is how the Supreme Court has achieved its patent reform 
project to favor accused patent infringers. The most common 
rationale the Court has employed to justify reversing the Federal 
Circuit is that the circuit court has improperly cabined or 
disregarded its precedent.208 But which precedent? The Court 
carefully selects which precedent to augment and revitalize and 
which precedent to sap and diminish. 
A striking example of precedent vitality in action is in the 
recent opinion in Impression Products v. Lexmark.209 The Court 
had two bodies of precedent that appeared to be in conflict. In 
cases such as the 1917 case, Motion Picture Patents, the Court had 
held that contractual restrictions imposed by patent holders were 
ineffectual to evade patent exhaustion.210 In Motion Picture 
Patents, the patent holder had imposed a contract requiring 
purchasers of its patented film projectors to use the projectors only 
with its separately sold film reels.211 When the patent holder 
brought a patent infringement claim to enforce the licensing 
restriction, the Court held that the claim must be dismissed because 
the patent rights were exhausted by the authorized first sale.212 But 
in a 1938 case called General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western 
Electric Co., the Court reached a contrary result on almost 
indistinguishable facts.213 In that case, the plaintiff authorized a 
third party to make and sell its patented vacuum tube amplifiers, 
but imposed a contractual restriction that purchasers of the 
equipment could only use it with amateur radio sets and not in 
motion picture houses.214 In this case, the Court held that the patent 
holder could sue purchasers of the equipment who used it in movie 
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theatres for patent infringement and that, because the contract 
imposed a restriction on the use of the equipment, there was no 
authorized first sale to purchasers who wanted to use it in a  
movie house.215 
The Federal Circuit had created a rule that contractual 
restrictions such as the ones at issue in these cases were effective 
to evade exhaustion, so long as they did not violate the antitrust 
laws or constitute patent misuse.216 This was based, in part, on a 
statement by the Supreme Court in Motion Picture Patents that it 
was “confirmed in the conclusion which we are announcing” 
regarding patent exhaustion by the fact that Congress “has enacted 
a law making it unlawful for any person engaged in interstate 
commerce ‘to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods . . . 
on the condition, agreement or understanding that the lessee or 
purchaser thereof shall not use . . . the goods . . . of  
a competitor . . . .’”217 
The Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit to rule that 
there was an absolute bar on contracting around patent 
exhaustion.218 The Court did so by choosing to revitalize its 
precedent in Motion Picture Patents and cabin its precedent in 
General Talking Pictures. The Court held that Motion Picture 
Patents and its other precedent finding patent exhaustion were not 
limited to cases involving antitrust violations or patent misuse. 
Rather, in those cases, “it was the sale of the items, rather than the 
illegality of the restrictions, that prevented the patentees from 
enforcing those resale price agreements through patent 
infringement suits.”219 And the Court limited its precedent in 
General Talking Pictures on the basis that, in that case “a licensee 
knowingly made sales outside the scope of its license.”220 Patent 
exhaustion was evaded only because the patent holder had granted 
a pre-sale restriction to its licensee on whom it was authorized to 
                                                                                                             
215 Id. at 180. 
216 See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prod., Inc., 816 F.3d 721, 736 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(en banc), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017). 
217 Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 517 (quoting 38 Stat. at L. 730, chap. 323) 
(ellipses added). 
218 See Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1535. 
219 Id. at 1533. 
220 Id. at 1535 (internal citations and ellipses omitted) (emphasis in original). 
2018] A PATENT REFORMIST SUPREME COURT 55 
sell the patented equipment to.221 “This does not mean that 
patentees can use licenses to impose post-sale restraints  
on purchasers.”222 
Hence, the Court relies on the flexible tool of stare decisis to 
selectively enhance or diminish the vitality of its precedent in order 
to pursue the objective of patent law reform.223 This is why the 
most common rationale for overruling the Federal Circuit is that 
the court has disregarded its older precedent. 
This raises a final question: which precedent does the Supreme 
Court rely upon in undertaking this task? The Court often relies on 
its precedent from the late 1800s and from the early to mid-
twentieth century.224 This is noteworthy because these were two 
eras of previous Supreme Court patent law reform. Like our 
current time, the late 1800s was a time when there was also a 
perception that a “patent thicket” was impeding innovation because 
non-practicing entities were asserting patents against the railroads 
and against farmers.225 When Congress failed to act, the Supreme 
Court “demonstrated a willingness to embrace the arguments 
advanced by railroads and their liberal supporters.”226 During this 
time the courts fashioned equitable doctrines to aid defendants, 
such as patent misuse, inequitable conduct, laches, the bar to 
patentability caused by secret sales,227 patent exhaustion,228 and the 
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reverse doctrine of equivalents.229 Similarly, the early to mid-
twentieth century was another period of common law patent 
reform, when the courts were mistrustful of patent “monopolies” 
and strengthened patent misuse, antitrust, and exhaustion remedies 
as well as invigorating the obviousness bar.230 
The fact that the Supreme Court is hearkening back to these 
eras of common law equitable reform helps to explain the other 
common rationales discussed above for overruling the Federal 
Circuit.231 Flexible standards, such as the four factors for 
considering injunctive relief or the broad range of acceptable 
rationales for declaring a patent obvious, are more akin to equity 
than law and provide more discretion to the district court.232 And 
rather than allowing the Federal Circuit to create special rules for 
patent law, the Court seeks to impose broader, equitable principles 
applicable to all federal cases.233 
III. THE MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
So how does one win a patent case at the Supreme Court? The 
ideal petition for certiorari will seek to reverse the Federal Circuit 
on some combination of the arguments that (1) the Federal Circuit 
failed to grant sufficient discretion to the district court, (2) perhaps 
by imposing a rigid inflexible rule that was (3) a special rule for 
patent law.234 But the most effective petition will locate a dusty old 
Supreme Court case from prior to the 1982 creation of the Federal 
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Circuit or even prior to the 1952 passage of the Patent Act and 
argue that the Federal Circuit has disregarded this precedent.235 
All of this is highly antithetical to the original mission and 
purpose of the Federal Circuit as perceived by its stakeholders and 
early judges. In the words of Judge Marion T. Bennett, the Federal 
Circuit was created during a period of economic recession because 
“technological innovation was being impeded by the lack of 
uniformity in application of the patent laws.”236 The problem, 
according to Judge Bennett, was that the regional circuits were not 
only failing to interpret the patent laws with uniformity, but were 
also weakening patent rights: “Some of the regional circuit courts, 
expressing strong feelings about the dangers of monopoly and 
having a low regard for the expertise of the Patent Office, tended 
not to give any deference to the administrative examination 
process and invalidated many patents.”237 Judge Pauline Newman 
has written that “[t]he proposal to reorganize the federal judicial 
structure arose not from abstraction or ideology, but from the 
practical urgency of recovering the incentive that can be provided 
by an effective patent system.”238 
Added to this was a strong feeling, advocated by Judge Rich, 
that the courts should decide patent questions by interpreting the 
1952 Patent Act and not by retreating to judicial opinions from 
prior to the passage of the statute. Judge Rich wrote, “[p]ick up any 
elementary work on statutory construction and it will tell you that 
the end and object of all construction is to find and enforce the 
intention of the legislature.”239 For example, Judge Rich objected 
to judicial opinions that disregarded the new statutory non-
obviousness requirement, “one of the two major changes or 
innovations in the statute,” to return to what he considered the 
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vague and standardless “invention” requirement developed over 
the centuries and originating in nineteenth century Supreme Court 
precedent.240 In 1983, one year after the Federal Circuit’s 
founding, the first Chief Judge of the court, Howard T. Markey, 
wrote a law review article called Why Not the Statute?241 This 
article represents a cri de guerre to judges and practitioners to 
follow the statute at the expense of court opinions. “There is no 
common law of patents,” wrote Judge Markey.242 “[W]hen it 
comes to patent cases, the statute is the law – and court opinions 
containing language and concepts contrary to the statute are 
unlawful.”243 Not so, says the Supreme Court: “the 1952 Patent 
Act was primarily intended to codify existing law.”244 
In sum, the early stakeholders and judges of the Federal Circuit 
appeared to view the court’s mission as bringing uniformity to 
patent law and strengthening patent rights by imposing definite 
rules to replace outdated, vague judicial standards and provide 
guidance to the district court. The Supreme Court’s twenty-first 
century patent law decisions conflict with this mission on all 
fronts. The Supreme Court is demanding that the Federal Circuit 
refrain from imposing rigid rules and instead rely on flexible 
standards that are faithful to the Supreme Court’s pre-1952 
precedent, grant the district courts wide discretion, and favor 
accused infringers. It is no wonder that the Supreme Court reverses 
or vacates the Federal Circuit in nearly 75% of the patent cases it 
hears. 
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CONCLUSION 
Over the past twenty years, the Supreme Court has been 
engaged in a project of judicial patent litigation reform to favor 
accused infringers. The Court has achieved this largely by 
reinvigorating the vitality of its precedent from eras prior to the 
passage of the 1952 Patent Act when it was engaged in similar 
projects of patent law reform. This project directly conflicts with 
the Federal Circuit’s perceived purpose of interpreting the 1952 
Act in order to create clear rules to guide the district courts, bring 
uniformity to patent law, and strengthen patent rights. 
